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DISAPPEARING WITHOUT A TRACE: SECTIONS 11 AND
12(a)(2) OF THE 1933 SECURITIES ACT
Hillary A. Sale*
Abstract: The judicially created tracing requirement thwarts the remedial sections of the 1933
Securities Act (the "Securities Act") by requiring shareholders to prove the impossible-that
their securities were actually issued in the questioned offering. Since 1967, courts addressing this
issue have, without question, adopted a requirement for section 11 that plaintiff-shareholders
trace their shares to the offering. Recently, courts have expanded it to apply to section 12(a)(2) as
well. For any but the first purchases of a share of stock, this requirement has always been
virtually impossible to meet. Courts have also used the 1995 opinion in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.
to eliminate even the possibility of tracing, thereby further eroding shareholders' access to
sections 11 and 12(a)(2). Now, many securityholders cannot sue under either section. This Article
examines sections 11 and 12(a)(2) and the cases interpreting them. The analysis shows that
tracing is almost impossible whenever a company has made more than one offering of securities
of a particular type, and as a result, few, if any, shareholders can successfully sue under sections
11 and 12(a)(2) even though the Securities Act arguably provides them with a remedy. This
development of the tracing requirement has the potential to defeat the statute's purpose of
promoting full and accurate disclosures in public-offering documents through strong deterrence
measures. To resolve the problem, the Article argues that the courts should apply the relaxed rules
of causation now employed in the toxic-tort context for indeterminate plaintiffs. Increasingly,
courts have allowed these indeterminate plaintiffs to use group-derived statistical evidence to
meet their buden ofproof. In the securities context, instead of requiring shareholders to prove the
impossible, courts should allow them to sustain their burden by employing the best available
evidence and proving that it is more likely than not that their securities were issued in the
questioned offering. In doing so, courts can both limit the statute's reach and fulfill Congress's
purpose in adopting it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1933 and 1934, Congress passed the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act. The Acts create financial transparency in the capital markets
by requiring companies to make significant initial and ongoing disclosures.
To ensure the required disclosures are accurate, the Acts contain several
private-enforcement mechanisms, including provisions for shareholder suits
for misrepresentations or omissions in a registration statement under section
11' or in a prospectus or oral communication under section 12(a)(2).2 This
Article explores the tracing requirement for claims under these Sections.
Tracing is one way by which courts are increasingly eliminating the
consequences of misstatements and omissions in the public-offering
context.
430
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
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In 1967, Judge Friendly interpreted section 11 to limit its coverage to
shareholders who had purchased shares pursuant to an allegedly faulty
registration statement 3 Section 11(a) states, in part: "In case any part of the
registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security... may... sue."4 Because
the word "such" lacks a reference, Judge Friendly questioned whether the
phrase provides a cause of action only to those shareholders who acquired
their securities pursuant to a particular offering or to any shareholder who
acquired a security of the same type as that issued in a particular offering.'
He determined that the former interpretation was the appropriate one and
established the tracing requirement to implement this interpretation.6
Since Judge Friendly's decision, courts have required shareholders to
plead and prove that the securities they own were issued in the offering for
which they allege the occurrence of a misstatement or omission.
Accordingly, to prove their claims under section 11, and sometimes under
section 12(a)(2), shareholders must connect, or "trace," the securities they
purchased to the offering document at issue. To do so, purchasers who
bought in the secondary market (the "Aftermarket") must show that the
securities were issued pursuant to the questioned offering-as opposed to
another offering of similar securities.7 Yet, as applied by the courts, the
tracing requirement is nearly impossible to meet and, therefore, prevents
many shareholders who would otherwise be entitled to a remedy from
proving their claims. As a result, the deterrent and remedial purposes of the
Securities Act have been severely limited.
The tracing requirement has existed for approximately thirty years, but
courts began to apply it aggressively to both sections 11 and 12(a)(2) after
the 1995 Supreme Court opinion in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.8 In Gustafson,
the Court held that section 12(a)(2) applies only to public offerings of
3. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269,272 (2d Cir. 1967).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (emphasis added).
5. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271.
6. See id at 273.
7. See, eg., Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-12272-DPW, 1998 WL 953726, at *4-8
(D. Mass. May 27, 1998).
8. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
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securities, not private agreements to sell securities. 9 This opinion restricted
the civil cause of action available to plaintiffs under section 12(a)(2) of the
Act," implicitly limiting securities litigation." Since 1995, courts have
employed Gustafson to restrict further shareholders' relief under sections 11
and 12(a)(2) to only the initial purchasers of securities in an offering
involving an alleged misstatement or omission. 2 Under this interpretation,
those who purchase the same securities in the Aftermarket would lack
standing. Gustafson, and the manner in which the courts have begun to
apply it, necessitates a reexamination of the tracing requirement to preserve
the remedial purposes of the Securities Act.
Part II of this Article discusses the causes of action that allow plaintiffs
to sue on the basis of material misstatements or omissions in the registration
statement (section 11) or in the prospectus or oral communication (section
12(a)(2)). Part III sets forth the history and evolution of the tracing
requirement, including a description of Gustafson and its effect on tracing.
Part IV argues that because of the way the market works, the pre-
Gustafson tracing requirements were not merely difficult, but as a practical
matter, nearly impossible to meet. The emerging post-Gustafson law in this
area raises the bar even further, eliminating even the possibility of tracing,
thereby making it virtually impossible for shareholders to survive a motion
to dismiss. 3  Part IV then reexamines Gustafson and the courts'
interpretation of how it applies to tracing, concluding that courts have
9. See id. at 573. Scholars and courts continue to debate whether the opinion stands for more. See,
e.g., Cooperman, 1998 WL 953726, at *6 (finding Gustafson restricts section 12(a)(2) actions to initial
public offerings); see also infra notes 285-328 and accompanying text.
10. See Therese H. Maynard, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Remedyfor Fraudulent
Postdistribution Trading?, 20 Sec. Reg. L.J. 152, 153 n.3 (1992) (collecting pre-Gustafson cases holding
that section 12(a)(2) applied to Aftermarket trading).
11. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 572 (stating that if section 12(a)(2) extended to nonpublic offerings, it
would create "vast additional liabilities.., independent of... substantive obligations" imposed by 1933
Securities Act); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50
Bus. Law. 1231, 1255 (1996) (noting that majority opinion implied concern about extent of securities
litigation).
12. The opinion raised several presumably unanticipated questions about other provisions of the
Securities Act as well. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1256 (stating that given "complex, technical
[nature of] statute, with subtle interrelationships," Court's decision might disturb "fabric of statute," and
questioning whether Court "ma[d]e a hash out of" statute); Elliot J. Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2)
After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions Remain, 50 Bus. Law. 1209, 1225-28 (1995) (noting
questions remain about whether certain types of offerings will be subject to section 12(a)(2)) (hereinafter
What Questions Remain]; Elliot J. Weiss, Some Further Thoughts on Gustafson v. Alloyd, 65 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 137, 152-53 (1996) (arguing that sales under certain regulations are no longer subject to section
12(a)(2)) [hereinafter Further Thoughts].
13. See infra notes 285-328 and accompanying text.
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improperly used Gustafson to restrict shareholders' remedies. The courts'
employment of Gustafson does, however, create the opportunity to revisit
the tracing requirement. A review of the statute, the legislative history, and
the case law reveals that tracing is a judicial invention that inappropriately
limits the statute in an underinclusive manner. Courts can resolve this
problem by applying the rationale behind the relaxed rules of proof of
causation applied in the toxic-tort context. Courts should allow shareholders
to proceed with their claims if they can provide statistically based evidence
to show that it is more likely than not their shares were issued pursuant to
the questioned offering. This proposal would allow courts to foster the
statute's deterrent and compensatory goals.
II. SECURITIES ACT SECTIONS 11 AND 12(a)(2)
In response to the market crash of 1929,14 Congress enacted the
Securities Act as its first attempt to create federal duties for the registration
and disclosure of information in connection with securities offerings. 5 The
Securities Act sets forth a standard for truthfulness in offering disclosures
and includes several provisions designed to force companies to face the
consequences of any misstatements or omissions in those disclosures.
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Act allow securityholders to sue certain
defendants for such misstatements or omissions.1 6
A. Section 11
Section 11 provides purchasers of a registered security with a claim
against enumerated defendants for material17 misstatements or omissions in
14. See William O. Douglas & George F. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of1933,43 Yale L. 171
(1933); see also Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical
Introduction to the Securities Act of1933 and the Securities ExchangeAct of1934,49 Ohio St. Li. 329,
337-42 (1988); James M. Landis, The Legislative History ofthe Securities Act of1933, 28 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 29,30 (1959).
15. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating that purpose of Act was to
provide full disclosure ofmaterial information to investors).
16. Section 15 of the Act establishes liability for controlling persons, but this form of liability is
secondary in nature and is not separately discussed. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994).
17. An alleged misstatement or omission is material ifreasonable investors would find it significant in
making their investment decisions. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
Materiality is a question of fact. See McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1990). Under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, an allegedly misleading statement may be
rendered inactionable by virtue of other cautionary language included in the registration statement. See,
e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying bespeaks-caution
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the registration statement."8 In addition to the corporation that is the issuer,
other possible defendants include (1) every person who signed the
registration statement; 9 (2) current directors or partners of the issuer;0
(3) future directors or partners named, with consent, in the statement;2'
(4) engineers, accountants, and other persons whose professions give
authority to statements they made and who are listed as having either
prepared or certified the registration statement;22 and (5) every underwriter
of the registered security. 3
The purpose of section 11 is to deter fraud by creating a powerful
incentive for persons associated with an offering to ensure full and accurate
disclosures in the registration statement. It accomplishes this purpose by
creating a "stringent standard' 24 of liability on, or serious consequences for,
parties who "play a direct role in a registered offering."2 Section 11
provides shareholders who purchase securities issued pursuant to
registration statements with a strict-liability claim against participants in the
doctrine to section 11 claims). For further discussion of this doctrine and its development, see Harold S.
Bloomenthal et al., Securities Law Handbook § 16.04 (2d ed. 1997).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,381-82 (1983).
Section 1 1(a) reads, in relevant part:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless
it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at
law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue-
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available to its security
holders an earnings statement covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the
effective date of the registration statement, then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be
conditioned on proof that such person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in
the registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and not knowing of such
omission, but such reliance may be established without proof of the reading of the registration
statement by such person.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(3).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5).
24. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983).
25. Id. at 382; see also H.R. Rep. No. 85, at 9 (1933) (stating that heavy legal liability under
section 11 corresponds with responsibility to public).
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offering of securities because liability accrues "even for innocent
misstatements.
26
To establish a prima facie case, the shareholders must prove that the
registration statement contained a material misstatement or omission.27 The
shareholders need not prove that they relied on the registration statement
unless they bought the securities more than twelve months after the
effective date of the registration statement and the issuer had already
distributed an "earnings statement."' Otherwise, their reliance is presumed.
Indeed, although defendants can raise the issue that shareholders knew of
the alleged misstatement or omission, the defendants bear the burden of
proving that knowledge.29 The issuer's only other defenses to strict
liability3" are the lack of materiality3 and the expiration of the statute of
limitations.32
One of the key and frequently used defenses available to defendants
other than the issuer is the due-diligence defense.33 The due-diligence
requirement helps to implement the statute's goals by creating responsibility
for reviewing background and offering materials and ensuring the accuracy
of any statements in those materials. Due diligence is required throughout
the process of determining whether the proposed offering is appropriate.34
For example, the issuer's legal counsel must examine relevant records to
ensure that the registration statement does not contain material
misstatements or omissions.3" The due-diligence defense thus arises from
26. Herman &MacLean,459 U.S. at382 (noting that liability against issuers is "virtually absolute!);
see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
27. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). Rule 158 defines the types of statements that qualify as earnings
statements for the purposes of this section. In general, statements that contain the types of information
contained in current reports issued pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 will suffice. See
I Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation § 7.3, at 380-81 n.19 (3d ed. 1995); 9 Louis
Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 4252 & n.138 (3d ed. 1992); Douglas & Bates, supra note
14, at 176.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
30. See Hazen, supra note 28, § 7.4, at 388; Loss & Seligman, supra note 28, at 4249,4255.
31. See supra note 17.
32. The statute of limitations for section 11 is one year from the date of discovery of, or the date on
which the purchaser should have discovered, the untrue statement or omission, or three years from the
effective date of the registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (Supp. Ell 1997).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1994); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
34. See Hazen, supra note 28, § 7.4, at 389.
35. See Richard W. Painter, TowardaMarketforLawyerDisclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
WhistleblowingRules, 63 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 221,270 (1995) (noting that both issuers and underwriters
must fulfill due-diligence obligations); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A
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statutory36 and regulatory3 7 requirements, and it applies to non-expertised
portions of the registration statement. The defendants would have a com-
plete defense if, after "reasonable investigation" or after acting with due
diligence, they had reasonable grounds to believe, and did so believe, that
the registration statement did not contain misleading statements or
omissions at the time it became effective.3"
Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 159 (1997) (describing basis of due-diligence requirement as "mistrust
of management" as sole source of information, thereby creating bonding of outside professionals with
their own reputational interests at stake).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3); see also In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994)
(discussing and applying due-diligence defense to various defendants); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp.,
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1997) (describing relevant circumstances for review of non-issuer due
diligence including: type of issuer, security, or person; office held; presence or absence of relationships
to issuer for proposed officers and directors; reasonable reliance on officers, employees, and others
whose particular duties should have given them knowledge of particular facts; role ofparticular persons
as underwriters and availability of information; and responsibility for facts or information incorporated
into documents).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A). Insiders who sign registration statements are subject to stringent due-
diligence review. See Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 684-85. The review is even more stringent for those who
are required by section 6 to sign the registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994). In general,
signing officers and directors must both read and possess the minimum necessary knowledge to
understand the document. See Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 684. For a discussion of the due-diligence defense,
see Jennifer O'Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability Under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 217, 227-29.
They can also try to prove that they had resigned, or had taken steps to resign, from their positions
with the issuer and had informed the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC")
and the issuer of their actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(1). Finally, if the portion of the registration
statement at issue became effective without the knowledge of the defendants, and they notified both the
Commission and the public when they became aware of that fact, they can escape liability. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(2).
There are two otherdefenses available. Section 11 applies the same standard to experts forthatportion
of the registration statement purporting to have been reviewed or evaluated by them. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(B). Experts may also avoid liability if they can prove that the registration statement did not
fairly represent the opinion they offered or that it was not a "fair copy" of their report. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(B). Defendants who rely upon experts may attempt to prove they did not believe, or did not
have any reasonable grounds to believe, that the expertised portion of the statement contained any
misstatements or omissions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C). Again, this defense is limited. For example,
defendants may not argue that their outside counsel (who are not signatories) reviewed, and thereby
expertised, the entire document. See Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 683, 687. Instead, this defense is limited to
portions of the statement which were purportedly made upon the authority of an expert. See id. at 683.
And even then, the defendants' obligation may extend to reviewing underlying documents, not just
figures or documents the company offers. See id. at 697 (refusing to credit underwriters' due-diligence
defense based on reliance on company-provided sales figures and holding that due-diligence obligation
extends to review of sales contracts); cf Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544,
582 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (noting that where underwriters are true outsiders, industry standard, which may
include reliance on client representations, applies).
Disappearing Without a Trace
Shareholders who succeed in proving their section 11 claim are entitled
to damages.39 They may recover the difference between the amount paid for
the securities (not to exceed the public offering price) and (1) the value of
the securities at the time of suit, (2) the price at which they sold the
securities prior to bringing suit, or (3) the price at which they sold the
securities after bringing suit, but before judgment, so long as these damages
do not exceed those under option (1). ° This formula provides the
shareholders who do not sell before suit with a potential windfall if their
securities appreciate after the filing date, but offers no protection if the price
declines after the judgment. The burden is on the defendants to prove that
any "depreciation in the value of [the] security" was due to causes other
than the misleading statements or omissions." All defendants lacking a
defense, except certain outside directors, are jointly and severally liable
with a right to contribution.42
B. Section 12(a)(2)43
Section 12(a)(2) is an express, negligence-like cause of action for
misstatements or omissions in a "prospectus or oral communication!" made
Finally, any portions of the document purporting to contain statements from public officials or
documents will not create liability forpersons relying on them, if they can prove that they did not know,
and had no reason to know, of any misstatements or omissions contained therein. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(D). The standard of reasonableness applied is that of a "reasonably prudent man in the
management of his own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1994).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1994). Outside directors without knowledge have proportionate liability.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 added this provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f)(2)(A)
(Supp. 1I 1997).
43. Section 12(1) contains a cause ofaction against sellers ofsecurities who violate section5 ofthe
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (Supp. 11[ 1997).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (Supp. 11 1997). Section 12 reads:
(a) In general. Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions ofsection 3, other
than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact
or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof
437
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in connection with the sale or offer for sale of a security. To prove their
prima facie case under section 12(a)(2), the shareholders must prove the
existence of a material45 misstatement or omission.46 Again, reliance is not
an element, 47 but section 12(a)(2) shareholders have the burden of proving
that they did not know of the misstatement or omission at the time they
bought the security.
48
Section 12(a)(2) liability is limited to sellers of securities, and the buyer
must have purchased securities from, or have been in privity with, the
seller.49 As interpreted by the courts, this requirement can severely limit
plaintiffs' ability to succeed with a claim under section 12(a)(2). 0
As a defense, the defendants may argue that they "did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known," of the alleged
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
such untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b), to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of
such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
(b) Loss causation. In an action described in subsection (a)(2), if the person who offered or sold
such security proves that any portion or all of the amount recoverable under subsection (a)(2)
represents other than the depreciation in value of the subject security resulting from such part
of the prospectus or oral communication, with respect to which the liability of that person is
asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statement not misleading, then such portion or amount, as the case may
be, shall not be recoverable.
45. See supra note 17.
46. See supra note 17.
47. See MidAmerica Fed. Say. & Loan v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1256
(10th Cir. 1989); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
49. The requirement is the same as under section 12(1). Compare Pinter v. Dali, 486 U.S. 622, 650,
654 (1988) (requiring that section 12(1) defendant be seller or person who solicits sale of securities to
plaintiff, not just remote participant in preparation of registration statement), with Shaw v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996) (requiring strict privity between seller and buyer in section
12(a)(2) claim). See also In re APACTeleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 90,705, at 93,372 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1999) (holding privity requirement is met not
only by those transferring title but also by any person who successfully solicits sale of securities,
including, specifically, persons signing prospectus).
50. See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1202 (holding that plaintiffs who purchased in firm-commitment
underwriting were in privity only with underwriters, not with issuers). Butsee Milman v. Box Hill Sys.
Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 90,619, at 92,813 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,1999)
(rejecting issuer and individual defendants' argument that because disputed offering was "firm
commitment underwriting," they were not in privity with plaintiffs).
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misstatement or omission.5 Courts use various factors to analyze this
defense, including level of participation in the transaction, access to source
material, skill in finding the truth, financial interest in completing the
transaction, and level of trust in the relationship between purchaser and
seller.52
Section 12(a)(2) claims have the same statute of limitations as those
under section I1.' The shareholders' remedy is limited to either rescission
if the buyers have not sold the security' or damages if they have.55 In
addition, since 1995, the defendants may try to prove that the misstatement
or omission did not cause the fall in the price of the security.56
Before Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,57 courts and scholars had usually agreed
that nonpublic offering buyers could bring a claim under section 12(a)(2).58
Thus, the pre-Gustafson applications of section 12(a)(2) included many
opinions where the disputed offering involved either a private-placement or
Aftermarket purchaser. As the discussion below reveals, however,
Gustafson limited the reach of section 12(a)(2), eliminating at least private-
placement purchases.59
51. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2); see also Therese H. Maynard, The Affirmative Defense ofReasonable Care
Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 57 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1068 (6th Cir. 1984).
53. See supra note 32 and accompanying text
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text Buyers must make their demand for rescission
immediately upon discovery of the misrepresentation. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. "21" Int'l
Holdings, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212,220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)(b) (Supp. 111997) (inserted by Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 105, 109 Stat 737,757 (1995)).
57. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
58. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1231 (noting that as of 1992, only one academic, Elliot Weiss,
held "iconoclastic" view that section 12(a)(2) was restricted to public offerings of securities and that
only some cases supported that view) (citing Elliott . Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act
Section 12(2) Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48 Bus. Law. I (1992)); Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 Emory L.. 95, 98
(1996) (noting that Professor Weiss was exception to virtually unanimous agreement among
commentators that section 12(2) applied to secondary and private tastions) (citing same article); see
also 17A J. William Hicks, Civil Liabilities: Enforcement and Litigation Under the 1933 Act
§ 6.01[3][a] (Release No. 14, Oct 1995) (suggesting that prior to Gustafson, "no one seriously doubted
that section 12(2) applie[d] to a placement or distribution of securities"); 3 Louis Loss, Securities
Regulation 1699 (2d ed. 1961) (stating that section 12(a)(2) applies to all security sales, whether
registered or not); Maynard, supra note 10, at 153 n.3 (listing numerous cases holding that section
12(a)(2) is not limited to public offerings).
59. See infra notes 184-211 and accompanying text.
Washington Law Review
C. Key Differences Between Sections 1] and 12(a)(2)
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) differ in some important ways. First, section 11 (a)
states that only shareholders who have acquired securities "at least twelve
months after" the registration statement's effective date or after the issuance of
an "earnings statement" must prove reliance on an alleged misstatement'0
Thus, generally, courts presume reliance for shareholders under section 1 l."
Because an offering rarely lasts for a year, this provision is generally
interpreted to mean that shareholders need not purchase their shares "in" the
offering at issue and can still bring a claim if they purchased in the
Aftermarket.62 Section 12(a)(2) shareholders need not prove reliance at all.63
Second, damages under section 1 1 are different from those provided for
under section 12(a)(2). Section 11(e) allows shareholders to recover
damages amounting to the difference between the amount they paid for the
security and the value of the security at the time of suit or sale not to exceed
the offering price.' In contrast, section 12(a)(2) shareholders can sue for
rescission or, if they no longer hold a security, damages.65 Section 1 l's
explicit limitation on damages to the offering price of a security has
provided courts with language to find that Congress intended the remedy to
be available to shareholders purchasing their securities outside the offering
or at a price different from the offering price.'
Third, section 12(a)(2) contains a privity requirement and section 11 does
not.67 The privity requirement limits access to section 12(a)(2)'s remedy and
has allowed some courts to find that privity alone limits access to the
remedy.68
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
61. See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (D. Colo. 1995).
62. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. The provision of section 11 requiring proof of
reliance for securities acquired after the issuance of an earnings statement covering at least 12 months
after the effective date of the offering was added to the Securities Act in 1934. See 78 Cong. Rec. 10,266
(1934).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e), (g) (1994).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1111997). Paragraph (b) allows sellers to limit damages if they
can prove that part or all of the alleged loss was not caused by the alleged misstatement or omission.
66. See, e.g., Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also infra
notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF TRACING
A. Tracing Defined
Courts use the term "tracing" to refer to the judicially created
requirement that to access sections 11 and 12(a)(2) shareholders must plead
and prove that they bought shares issued either "in" the public offering for
which the registration statement or prospectus was issued, or "pursuant to"
that offering. 9 Shareholders who are allowed to purchase "in" an offering
are those who are the first buyers of the securities issued (Original
Shareholders). ° This group is usually very limited, including only
institutional investors, members of Congress, and those with connections to
underwriters.7 Small investors "can rarely get in on... hot'72 initial public
offerings (IPOs) because IPOs are largely "private club[s] that the average
investor [i]sn't invited to join."73 Indeed, on average, small investors receive
less than one quarter of the total shares in an IPO.74 Shareholders who
purchase "pursuant to" an offering are those who buy securities issued in a
particular offering, but make their purchase in the Aftermarket (Aftermarket
Shareholders). Tracing requires shareholders to connect their securities to
the registration statement or prospectus for the offering at issue.
Although not initially applied as such, courts now describe the tracing
requirement as one of standing. Accordingly, unless the shareholders'
securities are connected to the registration statement, or prospectus or oral
69. See, e.g., Feiner v. SS&C Techs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (D. Conn. 1999).
70. See, e.g., Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Trust, No. CIV-.96-25J, 1998 WL 725946, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 15, 1998).
71. See, e.g., Phil Kunta &Natalie Hopkinson, Congress's Reports ShowSome Members Make Fast
Profits in IPOs, Wall St. J., June 15, 1998, at A4.
72. Aaron Luchetti & Terzeh Ewing, IPO-FundParadox: Sector Is Hot, InvestorsAre Cool, Wall St.
J., Sept. 3, 1999, at Cl.
73. Advertisement forFBR.COM (a division ofFriedman, Billings, Ramsey Group), Wall St. J., July
22,1999, at A15; cf Terzah Ewing, The Road Now Taken: Exclusive Shows ToutingNew IssuesArrive
on the Web, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1999, at C1 (noting road shows are places where "pros" learn about
IPOs but that "small investors aren't invited").
74. Terzah Ewing & Joshua Harris Prager, Many Are Finding IPOs Still Out of Reach, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 28, 2000, atC21 (noting some brokerage firms were making it harder for small investors to access
IPOs).
75. SeeCooperman v. Individual, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-12272-DPW, 1998 WL953726, at*4 (D. Mass.
May 27, 1998) (citing Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967)). Again, FBR.COM's
advertisement describes these shareholders as those who "got in eventually. But not until a lot of money
had passed hands" Advertisement for FBRCOM, supra note 73.
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communication on which they are suing, the shareholders do not have
standing to bring a case under either section.76 For example, if the
shareholders wish to sue under section 11, alleging a material misstatement
or omission in a registration statement covering preferred stock, they must
hold preferred stock issued in that particular offering." Shareholders who
buy at the same time as the preferred-stock offering, but purchase
previously issued common stock, cannot sue under section 11. That stock
was not issued pursuant to the new offering and therefore is not protected
by a section 11 claim based on the registration statement for the newly
issued stock. Thus, even if a misstatement or omission in the preferred-
stock registration statement persuaded the shareholders to buy the common
shares, the purchasers of the common stock do not have a cause of action
under section I L78 The same is true of shareholders who buy previously
issued common stock at the same time when a company offers new
common stock for sale-even if the shareholders were to request shares of
the newly issued common stock.79 Thus the rights of Aftermarket
Shareholders of previously issued stock are severely limited by the tracing
requirement."
76. See. e.g., Cooperman, 1998 WL 953726, at *4-7.
77. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d. Cir. 195 1) (holding that suit under
section 11 may be maintained "only by one who comes within a narrow class ofpersons-that is, those
who purchase securities that are the direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement").
The court, however, allowed the plaintiffs to sue under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5, noting that to hold otherwise "would afford a shelter or sanctuary for those who defraud
investors." Id. at 787. Ironically, the court supported its holding with the following example:
[Suppose a] corporation and its "insiders" put out a prospectus and registration statement, which
apparently complies with the provisions of the 1933 Act but which, as they well know, is false; this
they do with the successful aim of fraudulently inducing some investors to purchase the preferred
from the company but also other investors to purchase a much larger amount of the company's
common from the "insiders." The fraud-doers would be delighted to reimburse the purchasers of the
preferred and to avoid liability to the defrauded purchasers of the large amount of the common.
Id.
78. See id.
79. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.1967).
80. See, e.g., Guenther v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding
that Aftermarket Shareholder who was unable to trace securities to offering lacked standing for section
11 claim).
Procedurally, the defendants may raise ttacing in a variety of contexts. For example, they may move
for dismissal. See, e.g., Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying
motion to dismiss for lack of standing based on plaintiffs' failure to buy "in" offering and finding that
section 11 provides remedies for both purchasers in offering and those who can trace their purchase to
offering); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
90,198 (D. Nev. Apr. 2, 1998) (same). They may also move for summary judgment, arguing that the
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The question courts address is whether section 11 provides a cause of
action to only those shareholders who acquired their securities pursuant to a
particular offering (that is, any shareholder in the chain of title of a
particular share) or to all shareholders who acquired a security of the same
type as that issued pursuant to a particular offering." Thus, there are three
potential types of claimants: (1) Original Shareholders, (2) Aftermarket
Shareholders, and (3) shareholders of the same type of stock as that issued
in the disputed offering but purchased in a different offering. Assuming that
the statute was intended to provide all shareholders who purchase their
shares pursuant to an allegedly misleading registration statement with a
cause of action (types (1) and (2)) with a claim, requiring tracing results in
an underinclusive plaintiff pool. Aftermarket Shareholders of a company
with multiple offerings are unlikely to be able to prove that their shares
were issued under any one offering and are, therefore,. precluded from
making a claim. The third category, however, is overinclusive because it
provides all shareholders owning shares of the type issued in the offering
with a claim, even if the shares were not issued in the disputed offering.
1. Barnes v. Osofsky
In an early and leading case on the subject, Barnes v. Osofsky,"2 Judge
Friendly83 resolved the question for the Second Circuit by defining the
shareholders lack standing. See 777 Best Sec. Litig., [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,485 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26,1994) (denying motion forsummary judgment and finding tracing irrelevant
where plaintiff had purchased type of warrants issued in disputed offering); Abbey v. Computer
Memories, 634 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment for
lack of standing where plaintiff was unable to trace securities to public offering). Defendants also raise
tracing in their opposition to the shareholders' motions for class certification, arguing either that the
named shareholders are not adequate or typical pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and
23(a)(4), or are inappropriate due to lack ofpredominance ofcommon questions of fact and law pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See In re Data Access Sys. See. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130
(D.NJ. 1984) (declining to deny class certification on basis of defendants' argument that plaintiffwho
purchased "in" offering was not adequate and typical to represent others who purchased in Aftermarket)
(same in context of predominance). But see In re Regal Communications Corp. Sec. Litig., [1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,871 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1995) (finding opposition to
class-certification motion inappropriate vehicle for raising standing arguments). Defendants have also
raised the issue in the context of motions to remove a case to the federal court. See Bennett v. Bally Mfg.
Corp., 785 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1992) (discussing defendants' argument that plaintiffs lacked standing
for 1933 Act claim and included it in complaint only to prevent removal).
81. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271.
82. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967). In Barnes, the issue arose in the context where shareholders would
have access to a settlement that limited funds to those shareholders "who beneficially acquired (in [their]
own name[s] or otherwise) part of the... shares which [were] the subject" of allegedly misleading
offering document. Id at 270.
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potential plaintiff pool to include types (1) and (2) (Offering Shareholders),
but adopting a tracing requirement that restricts the claim to Original
Shareholders only. He first considered the language of section I1 . He
noted that when newly registered shares are combined with those already
being traded, the word "'such' has no referent."85 Although he posited that
the "narrower" interpretation of "acquiring a security issued pursuant to the
registration statement" was more natural, he admitted that the statute could
easily be interpreted to cover a shareholder who acquired a security "of the
same nature" as that issued pursuant to the registration statement. 6 Thus, he
reasoned, if a court had a "good reason for doing so" it could adopt the
latter interpretation. 7
Then he addressed the shareholders' contention that the court should
adopt the latter, and more broad, understanding of the statute. 8 He agreed
that an "unduly optimistic" offering document might affect the price of
shares already in the market, not just those being issued.89 Thus, a
materially misleading registration statement might affect contemporaneous
purchasers of previously issued securities the same way as it affects
Original Shareholders " He also observed that the language of section 11
does not indicate that it applies only to the Offering Shareholders. So, to
limit its use to only the shareholders who can trace their shares to the
offering creates an outcome which "turn[s] on mere accident since most
trading is done through brokers who neither know nor care whether [the
shares are] newly registered or old shares."'"
Next, he noted the shareholders' argument that it is virtually impossible
to determine whether previously traded shares are old or new. He
acknowledged that stock is often held in margin accounts or in street names,
83. Judge Henry J. Friendly is credited with having shaped much of the law of securities. See
Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Litigation: The Creation of a Judicial
Registration, 50 SMU L. Rev. 777, 809-12 (1997) (noting Judge Friendly authored 80 majority
securities opinions and was cited in 10 Supreme Court opinions and 355 non-Second Circuit lower
federal court opinions); see also Bruce A. Ackerman et al., In Memoriam: Henry]. Friendly, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1709, 1715 (1986) (comments of Professor Paul Freund).
84. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271.
85. Id.; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
86. Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Indeed, the fraud-on-the-market theory supports this conclusion. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting fraud-on-the-market theory).
91. Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271.
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and that many brokerage houses do not identify specific shares with
particular accounts, noting that they simply "treat the account as having an
undivided interest in the house's position."' These problems in identifying
particular shares, let alone their source, he reasoned, make tracing
difficult.93 Indeed, interpreting the statute in the more narrow fashion could
result in different treatment for similarly situated persons.94
Although he acknowledged the shareholders' arguments, Judge Friendly
held that to read the statute to allow all type (3) shareholders access to
section 11 remedies was "inconsistent with the overall public-offering
statutory scheme"'95 of the Act. According to him, the purpose of section 11
was to "insure full and accurate registration statement[s]" through the use of
stringent and easily accessible remedies.96 Because Congress made harsh
remedies easily available to shareholders, Judge Friendly reasoned, it was
"unlikely" that Congress intended that section 11 contain a remedy for
securities other than those issued pursuant to a particular registration
statement.97 He instead found a remedy for type (3) shareholders in a
different part of the Act. He distinguished section 11 from sections 12(a)(2)
and 17, noting that the latter sections required a different type of proof that
is more akin to scienter and, therefore, were not limited to newly issued
shares.9"
In further support of his narrow reading of the statute, Judge Friendly
pointed to section 1l's damages provision, which limits the maximum
recoverable damages to the public-offering price of the security. He
reasoned that if the offering price controlled the level of damages, it was
illogical to assume that securities not included in that offering would be
covered by section 11.9
Next, he turned to the legislative history of the statute. Judge Friendly
noted that the shareholders pointed to a statement in the legislative history
92. Id at272.
93. See id
94. See id.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id He also noted that even though Gustafson changed the reference to section 12(a)(2), sections
12(a)(2) and 17 were not limited to newly registered securities. See id; see also id. at 272 n.1 (noting
that purchasers ofsecurities other than those registered may have section 12(a)(2) claim but not section
11 claim).
98. See id at 272. This conclusion is the opposite of that reached by many later courts when
interpreting section 12(a)(2). See, e.g., infra notes 165, 167, and accompanying text.
99. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272.
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that the "remedies of section 11 were accorded to purchasers 'regardless of
whether they bought their securities at the time of the original offer or at
some later date." 0 Apparently, the shareholders argued that this statement
provided a remedy to any purchaser who was "reasonably affected" by
registration-statement language. Judge Friendly, however, reasoned that the
legislative history could be extended only to the shareholders with traceable
shares, or the Offering Shareholders.''
He came to this conclusion by noting that both the House and Senate
versions of section 11 "established a conclusive presumption" of reliance by
those "'acquiring any securities specified in such statements and offered to
the public.'" 0 2 The bills also stated that the shareholders who acquired
securities to which the registration statement related, "'either from the
original issuer or any other person"' would have a cause of action against
the enumerated defendants.0 3 The Conference Report differed only as to the
enumerated defendants and their defenses, but not these provisions. " Thus,
he reasoned, Congress indicated its agreement that this section of the Act
covered only Offering Shareholders.'0 5
Then, Judge Friendly examined earlier cases from courts within the
Second Circuit, finding them in accord with his view." For example, he
considered an opinion in which the court had stated in dictum that "an
action under section 11 may be maintained 'only by one who comes within
a narrow class of persons, i.e., those who purchase securities that are the
direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement.' 0 7 This
statement, he reasoned, carried "particular weight" because its author was
Judge Frank, "a leading member of the SEC in its early days .... 108
100. Id. at 273 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, at 9 (1933)); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
101. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 273.
102. Id. at 272 (citing S. 875, 73d Cong. § 9 (1933) and H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. § 9 (1933)).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 272-73 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 152, at 26 (1933)).
105. See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 152, at 26 (1933)).
106. See id. at 273.
107. Id. (quoting Fischmanv. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2dCir. 195 1)) (addressing ruling of
lower court not raised on appeal that common stockholders did not have cause of action under section 11
for registration statement for preferred stock).
108. Id. Judge Friendly also cited Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (limiting section 11 to purchasers in offering) and 3 Loss, supra note 58, at 1731 n.160.
For other early cases finding that the plaintiffs must trace their securities to the offering in question,
see Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 286 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (granting summary judgment for
defendants where plaintiffpleaded that he purchased shares" 'pursuant to a Registration Statement"' but
446
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Finally, he acknowledged that his narrow interpretation of the statute
could result in an "accidental impact" as between two contemporaneous,
open-market purchasers both requesting the same type of securities: one
who happens to buy securities issued in a particular offering and another
who happens to buy securities from a different, undisputed offering."° He
remained unpersuaded, however, that other interpretations of the statute
were more accurate and concluded that the lower court had properly
eliminated from the settlement class those shareholders who could not trace
their securities to the offering at issue."' Instead, he suggested that it was
perhaps time for Congress to "reexamine" the statute."'
2. Tracing Methods
Since Barnes v. Osofsky, shareholders have endeavored, unsuccessfully,
to convince the courts either that tracing is not required or that it is properly
accomplished through statistical or other means. One case, Kirkwood v.
Taylor,"' proposed and discarded several tracing methods. In Kirkwood,
the court defined four methods of tracing: direct trace, fungible mass,
contrabroker, and heritage."3
a. Direct Tracing
The direct-tracing method applies only to the limited group of Original
Shareholders, or those who purchase their securities in the public offering at
was unable to prove that his stock was new, not old), and Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.RD. 584, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that plaintiffs purchased shares directly from underwriter).
109. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 273.
110. See id
111. See i Apparently, the plaintiffs urged the court to put the tracing burden on the defendants. The
court rejected the suggestion, noting that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the "unreasonableness" of
leaving the burden on them. See id at 273 n.2.
In 1983, the Supreme Court decided Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
Although the focus of this opinion was whether purchasers should be barred from suing under section
10(b) ofthe Exchange Act if they also had access to section 11, the Supreme Court described section 11
as providing only purchasers of registered securities with claims. See id. at 381-82. It also stated that
section 11 provides purchasers of registered offerings with special protection. See I at 383. Neither that
opinion nor Barnes discussed the underinclusive nature of the tracing doctrine and how it could erode
the deterrent effect of sections 11 and 12(a)(2). Indeed, although Barnes applied the tracing doctrine
only to section 11, courts discussing tracing in the context of section 12(a)(2) have found that it applied
to claims under that section as well. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
112. 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984).
113. See id at 1378-83.
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issue. According to the Kirkwood court, the indicia for determining whether
a shareholder's purchase qualifies under this method include: (1) a broker
indicating interest on behalf of a customer; (2) a customer who receives a
copy of the "red herring," or preliminary, prospectus; (3) a purchase order
with a notation indicating an offering purchase; (4) a purchase price
matching the offering price;" 4 (5) a lack of a commission; (6) a
confirmation slip with language regarding the offering; and (7) a special
code for the transaction at the brokerage firm. 15
Using these indicia, the Kirkwood court found that a shareholder who
purchased two hundred shares of stock on the offering date from an offering
underwriter bought traceable shares." 6 It noted, however, that because the
shareholder could not trace its other Aftermarket securities to the offering, it
lacked standing under section 11 for those shares.
17
b. Fungible-Mass Tracing
The second test, the fungible-mass method, is based on statistical
probability."8 Under this theory, the shareholders argued that because
brokers keep securities in house holding accounts, which are essentially one
fungible mass of securities, neither shareholders nor brokers can know with
certainty which security is transferred." 9 Accordingly, they argued statistics
could be employed to show the probability that any given shares were
issued in the questioned offering. For example, in another case, In re
Elscint, Ltd. Securities Litigation, 20 the shareholders argued that they
should be able to pursue their section 11 claims using statistics based on the
percent of newly issued shares in the market.' The defendants responded
by arguing that unless the shareholders could actually trace their
Aftermarket purchases to newly issued shares, they lacked standing to sue
114. Unless an offering is oversubscribed and all shares are sold at the offering price, the purchase
price for a share bought in an offering may differ from the offering price. See In re Worlds of Wonder
See. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 95,004, at 95,630 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1990) (noting that although
offering price was $18, plaintiff bought shares from sub-underwriter for higher price).
115. See Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378 (citing affidavit).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1378-79.
119. See id.
120. 674 F. Supp. 374 (D. Mass. 1987).
121. See Elscint, 674 F. Supp. at379; see also Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378-79; Lorberv. Beebe,
407 F. Supp. 279,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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under section 11 and were not qualified to serve as class representatives for
a section 11 class."
The shareholders responded that they should not have to offer "chain of
title" proof to show "beyond question" that their shares were issued in the
offering."n Instead, they argued, the court should allow them to use
"probabilistic" evidence to support their standing." They also argued that
the required level of proof regarding the status of their shares was only a
"preponderance of the evidence."'"
The court agreed that the tracing precedents did not require proof
"beyond question." '26 But, it stated, the shareholders' argument could not
succeed without a "better foundation" than that their shares "might" have
been issued pursuant to a registration statement.2 7 Instead, the court noted,
the only shareholders who could have a viable claim under section 11 were
those who could "prove" that their shares were new.'28 The court also
agreed that the applicable standard of proof was the preponderance of the
evidence.'29 Thus, according to the court, the shareholders needed to prove a
purchase of "some particular number of 'new' shares, each at some
particular price" in order to support both liability and damages.30 Yet, the
court also reasoned that the required proof could be direct, circumstantial,
or both, and that the latter category could include statistical evidence if it
had as its basis data that was "adequately authenticated and supportably
interpreted."''
The court, however, did not explain what it meant by such statistical
proof when it rejected the shareholders' proffered calculations.' The
shareholders argued that there was a fifty-percent probability the shares they
purchased on certain dates contained some new shares and an eighty-two-
percent probability for other dates. 33 The court said this evidence fell
122. See id
123. Id.
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id (citing sur-reply of named underwriters).
128. Id
129. Seeid at380.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. See id.
133. See id
449
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"short" of that required to allow it to infer that "any one of the plaintiffs,
more probably than not, purchased at least some determinate number of
'new' shares."' 34 To accept the shareholders' theory, the court reasoned, it
would have to find that the section 11 standard did not require them to be
purchasers of a determinate number of new shares at a determinate price.'35
The court was unwilling to reach that conclusion and found that the
shareholders were unable to serve as class representatives.' 36
The court rejected the shareholders' tort analogy.'37 The shareholders
argued that in recent cases, courts had accepted group-based statistical
evidence to allow plaintiffs to meet their burden of production that a
particular form of negligence was a "substantial factor" in the alleged
harm. 3 The example the court described was one in which the shareholders
might argue that the evidence supported a "reasoned inference" that some
form of negligence increased the risk of death by twenty-five percent, but
there was insufficient proof to show that it was more than fifty percent
probable death would not have occurred but for the alleged negligence or
that negligence was a cause in fact of the death. 39 The court posited that
applying this analogy would allow the shareholders to "relax[]" the tracing
requirement so that meeting it with probabilistic evidence would be
possible, even if that evidence did not support a reasoned inference that the
suing shareholder purchased a determinate number of shares that were,
more probably than not, new shares. 4°
The court found that the analogy was plausible but rejected it and the use
of the plaintiffs' use of statistical evidence. In doing so, the court noted that
to whatever extent the cases indicated the standard of proof for causation
had relaxed in the torts realm, the change was not appropriate in the
securities context.' 4' Instead, the court concluded that securities laws protect
134. Id. The court declined to address the defendants' challenges to the premises and inferences
involved in the plaintiffs' statistical analyses. See id.
135. See id. Other courts have rejected statistical analyses as well. See, e.g., In re Quarterdeck Office
Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9198,092, at 98,742 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993) (finding
insufficient plaintiffs' assertion that it was more probable than not that their shares were issued pursuant
to registration statement because 97% of shares outstanding when they purchased their shares were
covered by registration statement).
136. See Elscint, 674 F. Supp. at 382.
137. Seeid. at381.
138. Id. at 380-81 (citing various cases in which plaintiffs had used statistical evidence to support
"substantial factor" element).
139. Id. at 381.
140. Id.
141. See id.
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persons from financial, not physical harm, and therefore, the protection
need not be as expansive. 42 The court also noted that the cases the
shareholders cited were the exception, not the norm, and should not be
expanded to a general category of cases in either the tort or securities
context. 43 Thus, according to the court, the proposed class plaintiffs could
not represent, or be members of, the class.1"
c. Contrabroker Tracing
The contrabroker tracing method would allow the shareholders to argue
that they purchased their shares from their broker who in turn had
purchased the shares from another broker/market maker in the stock. 45 In
Kirkwood, the shares the second broker sold were from its house account,
not from one of its customers.'" The second broker was also an underwriter
for the offering; thus, the shareholders argued, their shares were traceable to
the offering. 47
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that to accept it would
require an assumption that the broker's house account contained only
offering shares on the dates on which the shareholders purchased their
stock. '4 According to the court, the shareholders had not provided any
evidence as to whether the brokers were market makers in the stock before
142. See ia
143. See id
144. See id at382. The court did not dismiss the complaint as requested by some of the defendants.
Instead, it found that the tracing issue was more properly decided at the summary-judgment, not the
class-certification or motion-to-dismiss stage. See id In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that to
require the shareholders explicitly to allege tracing before discovery, a standard that might convert the
motion into one for summary judgment, was inappropriate. See id at 383. Several other courts have
declined to find a lack of standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage for the same reasons. See, e.g., In re
Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R1D. 130,146 (D.NJ. 1984) (holding that plaintiff's ability to trace
stock is merits issue not properly resolved at class-certification stage). But cf In re Quarterdeck Office
Sys., Inc. See. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,092, at 98,742 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993) (noting that
although standing is merits issue, court may consider evidence, such as that pertaining to tracing, which
goes to class-certification requirements). Although this might seem helpful to the plaintiffs, it is unlikely
that even with discovery, the plaintiffs can prove tracing. See infra note 212 (citing cases discussing
impossibility of tracing standard). Thus, they are likely to lose on this element at summary judgment.
See, eg., Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (granting
summary judgment where defendants showed that tracing was impossible for plaintiffs to prove).
145. See Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (D. Minn. 1984).
146. See ia
147. See id
148. See id
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the offering date. 149 If so, the court reasoned, the house accounts might have
included old and new shares.150 Moreover, the court noted, if it accepted this
argument, shareholders would be able to meet the tracing requirement
solely by buying their securities from market-maker brokers.' Thus, the
court concluded that this method was also insufficient.
d. Heritage Tracing
Finally, the Kirkwood court considered the heritage tracing method." 2
The shareholders argued that they could compare the individual stock
certificates (Individual Certificates) they received from their brokers to the
records of the company's transfer agent, identify the certificates by code
number,5 3 and then identify the stock certificates from which the Individual
Certificates were issued (Surrendered Certificates). 54 Because some of the
Surrendered Certificates were offering certificates, the plaintiffs, by
comparing the two, proposed to trace their shares' heritage to the
offering.'
The defendants successfully repelled this argument with two points.
First, only some of the Surrendered Certificates to which the plaintiffs
traced their shares were traceable to original offering certificates.5 6 Second,
the total number of shares represented by the Surrendered Certificates
exceeded the total number of shares in the Individual Certificates.' 7
Therefore, the defendants argued, there was no way to tell which, if any, of
the plaintiffs' shares were actually traceable to the disputed offering
document.'
The court agreed, noting that in no case was it clear "that all or even any
of plaintiffs' shares [were] necessarily offering shares."' 59 Thus, it
149. See id.
150. See id
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1382.
153. See id. The shareholders were able to trace their certificates because the stocks were issued in
their names. Today, however, the usual practice is to hold shares in street names. As a result, this method
is unlikely to prove fruitful for modem shareholders. See infra note 236.
154. See Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1382.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Id. (italics in original).
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concluded, the plaintiffs had succeeded in proving only that they "might'
have purchased shares issued in the questioned offering (Offering Shares)
and such a showing was insufficient to establish their claim."e Although it
conceded that the shareholders faced a difficult task,"' the court decertified
the section 11 class and granted summary judgment for those defendants
facing only section 11 claims.'
3. Pre-Gustafson Tracing
After Barnes, defendants began to use the tracing requirement to argue
that only Offering Shareholders had standing to pursue section 11 and
12(a)(2) claims and that direct tracing was the only way to prove such
status. In response, most courts held that shareholders must trace section 11
claims. 63 Some also required section 12(a)(2) shareholders to trace their
160. Id; seealsoBarnesv. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269,273 (2dCir. 1967); McFarland v. Memorex Corp.,
493 F. Supp. 631, 641-42 & n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (finding insufficient plaintiff's declaration
containing "unverified speculation as to the meaning of certain notations on unauthenticated copies
of... confirmation slips"); Lorberv. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279,286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Courts have
rejected any sort of burden shifting that would allow the plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to show
that they might have purchased in the offering, and then shift the burden to the defendants, who have
access to and control over more information. See, eg., Barnes, 373 F.2d at 273 n.2; Lorber, 407 F. Supp.
at 287.
161. See Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1383.
162. See id at 1386-87.
163. See, e.g., In re College Bound Consol. Litig., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,310, at 90,134
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (requiring tracing of section 11 claims); In re Kendall Square Research Corp.
Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26,29 (D. Mass. 1994) (same); In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. See. Litig.,
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,092, at 98,742 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993) (same); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. "21" Int'l Holdings, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212,218 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); Guenther v. Cooper
Life Sciences, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437, 1439 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same); Eichenholtz v. Brennan, No.
CIV.A.88-515(JCL), 1989 WL 85616, at *11 (D.NJ. July 27, 1989) (same); In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec.
Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374,376 (D. Mass. 1987) (same); Abbey v. ComputerMemories, Inc., 634 F. Supp.
870, 872-74 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (same); In re Lilco See. Litig., 11l F.R.D. 663, 671 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(same); In re Masstor Sys. Corp. See. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,719, at 93,487 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 27,1986) (same); Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378 (same); In re Data Access Sys. See. Litig., 103
F.LD. 130, 145-46 (D.NJ. 1984) (same); Ross v. Warner, 480 F. Supp. 268,273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(same); Pearlman v. Gennaro, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,006, at'94,052-53 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1973)
(same); Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (same); Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875,877 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (same); cf In re SeagateTech. See. Litig., 115
F.R.D. 264, 267 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (requiring tracing for section I 1 claim and not discussing issue with
respect to section 12(a)(2) claim). ButseeIn re Delmarva Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1293, 1309 (D. Del.
1992) (finding only purchasers in offering have claim); Langert v. Q-1 Corp., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,445, at 95,541 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1974) (noting only shareholders purchasing directly from
underwriters have section 11 and 12(a)(2) causes of action); cf Mullaly v. Q.T. Wiles, No. CIV.A.91-M-
731, 1991 WL 504866, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 1991) (appearing to require purchases in offering for
both sections).
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claims."6 More often, courts discussed tracing for section 11 claims and
addressed section 12(a)(2) only in the privity context. 6 The language of
section 12(a)(2), which courts have interpreted to require strict privity
between the offeror/seller and the purchaser, arguably limits the availability
of the claim to Original Shareholders."6 In more recent years, a few courts
have found that shareholders making section 12(a)(2) claims must plead and
prove that they were Original Shareholders,'67 but those making section 11
164. See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272,286-87 (3d Cir. 1992) (requiring tracing for
both sections); In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 825 F. Supp. 578, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); PPM
Am., Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 820 F. Supp. 970,975-76 (D. Md. 1993) (same); Ciresi v. Citicorp, 782 F.
Supp. 819, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
9195,004, at 95,630 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1990) (same); Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962,
972 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Hammond v. Hendrickson, No. 85-C-9829, 1986 WL 8437, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 30, 1986) (same); In re Eagle Computer Sec. Litig., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,741, at 93,604-
06 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1986) (same); cf McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 743, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (requiring tracing for section 12(a)(2)); McCowan v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 94,423, at 92,727 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1989) (same);
Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,207, at 91,568 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1985)
(same).
165. See, e.g., In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 98,485, at 91,309-10 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 26, 1994) (requiring tracing for section 11, but discussing section 12(a)(2) only in privity
context); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F. Supp. 948,966,983-85 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (same); In re
PNC Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 96,865, at 93,524-25 (W.D. Pa. June 9, 1992) (same); In re
Newbridge Networks See. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 275, 279-81 (D.D.C. 1991) (same); Persky v. Turley
Gould, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,483, at 92,132-34 (D. Ariz. 1991) (same); Rice v. Windsor Indus.,
Inc., No. 85-C-4196, 1986 WL 2728, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1986) (same); Gibb v. Delta Drilling
Co., 104 F.RtD. 59, 69-71 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (same); Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270,
273 & n. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); McFarland, 493 F. Supp. at 641-42,647 (same); Lorber v. Beebe,
407 F. Supp. 279,286-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D.
217,222-23,226 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); cf. Akerman v. Oryx Communications, 810 F.2d 336,344 (2d
Cir. 1987) (eliminating section 12(a)(2) issue on privity basis).
166. See Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
190,692, at 93,283 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1999) (stating privity requirement of section 12 may restrict
potential plaintiffs to original shareholders); In re Number Nine Visual Tech. Group Sec. Litig., No.
CIV.A.96-11207-WGY, 1999 WL 362789, at *29 n.7 (D. Mass. June 1, 1999). For a discussion of
privity, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
167. See In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602,617 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (requiring purchase
"in" offering for section 12(a)(2)); cf Reed v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1285, 1291-92 (S.D.
Tex. 1995) (deciding that section 12(a)(2) applies only to initial offerings, thus presumably negating
tracing); In re Proxima Corp. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 98,236, at 99,622 (S.D. Cal. May 3,
1994) (limiting section 12(a)(2) shareholders to those who purchased in offering as defined by
prospectus-delivery period); Wade v. Industrial Funding Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 98,144, at
99,024-25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1993) (limiting 12(a)(2) shareholders to prospectus-period purchasers);
Tregenza v. Great Am. Communications Co., 823 F. Supp. 1409, 1418 (N.D. I11. 1993) (same); Budget
Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hirsch, 810 F. Supp. 1253, 1256-59 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that for section
12(a)(2) to apply, plaintiff must allege purchase in offering, but not discussing whether tracing would be
sufficient); Leonard v. Stuart-James Co., 742 F. Supp. 653, 658 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (same); Kaplan v.
Pomerantz, 131 F.R.D. 118, 127 (N.D. III. 1990) (noting difference between purchasing in offering and
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claims need not"68 Shareholders able to meet the so-called direct-tracing
test were few in number. 69 For example, one court dismissed counts under
both sections where a plaintiff had actually purchased on the offering date
at the offering price, but failed to allege that the shares he purchased "were
a part of the stock" issued on that date. 0
A few courts adopted a method that allowed a limited number of
Aftermarket Shareholders to meet the tracing requirement.' For example,
in Wade v. Industrial Funding Corp.,72 the court found that the
shareholders who purchased within the prescribed ninety-day prospectus
delivery period had standing, but those purchasing more than ninety days
after the offering did not. The court based its ninety-day rule on section
4(3)(B) of the Securities Act and accompanying regulations, which require
that a prospectus be distributed to all Aftermarket Shareholders within
ninety days after the offering date for IPO securities that are traded on a
national securities exchange. 74
Aftermarket purchase, but not deciding whether difference matters); Ralph v. Prudential-Bache See.,
Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1322, 1323-24 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F.
Supp. 1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
168. See ChambersDev., 848 F. Supp. at 617 (allowing tracing for section 11 claims); Proxima, Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH), at 99,622 (same); Wade, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 99,023 (recognizing tracing
for section 11 claims).
169. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
170. Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,207, at9l,568-69 (S.D.N.Y. July
11, 1985) (dismissing section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims ofplaintiffwho purchased on same date as offering
at offering price).
171. See Proxima, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 99,619 (limiting section 12(a)(2) shareholders to those
who purchased in offering as defined by prospectus-delivery period); Wade, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH), at
99,024 (limiting section 12(a)(2) shareholders to prospectus-period purchasers).
172. Wade, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH), at 99,024. But see In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. See.
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,092, at 98,742 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993) (allowing tracing for
section 11 claims, but not through probability method).
173. See Wade, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 99,024-25.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (1998). The prospectus delivery period varies
depending on the type of issuer and the type of offering. For example, an IPO on neither a national
securities exchange nor an interdealer quotation system is subject to the longer 90-day requirement. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.174(d). Ironically, the rationale for this limitation is that it is an unnecessary burden to
force issuers to find purchasers. See 53 Fed. Reg. 11,844 (1988).
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B. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.'75
1. Background
Since 1995, courts have deployed the Supreme Court opinion Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co. to erode further section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims. Although the
opinion was not about tracing, courts have employed it to restrict further
shareholders' ability to trace their purchases.'76 Gustafson involved a
dispute between the plaintiffs/purchasers of Alloyd Co. and the
defendants/former shareholders over a private stock placement agreement
(the "Agreement").1' The contract for the sale of Alloyd provided that, if at
year end, the financial statements and audit revealed a difference between
the estimated value and the actual value of the company, the disappointed
party would be entitled to an adjustment in the purchase price.' When
Alloyd's year-end earnings for 1989 were lower than the negotiation
estimates, the buyers had a contractual right to recover $815,000.' 79 Instead,
the buyers sued, seeking rescission of the Agreement-arguably a prospectus
under section 12(a)(2)-and claiming that the selling shareholders' financial
statements had "render[ed] untrue the representations and warranties" in the
Agreement.18
0
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that section 12(a)(2)
175. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
176. This opinion has provoked considerable discussion among scholars, with most being critical of
it. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1231-32 (criticizing majority opinion as "most poorly reasoned,
blatantly results-driven securities opinion" of recent vintage); Ted J. Fiflis, Gustafson vs. Alloyd Co.,
Inc.: Judicial vs. Legislative Power, 23 Sec. Reg. L.J. 423 (1996) (suggesting majority engaged in
judicial activism by ignoring clear statutory construction, thereby resulting in ill-thought opinion with
unsettling consequences); Edmund W. Kitch, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: An Opinion That DidNot Write,
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 121-22 (suggesting opinion creates new and surprising definition for prospectus
by ignoring language and structure of statute, thereby decreasing confidence in judiciary); Letsou, supra
note 58, at 99 (using economic and legal analyses to argue that majority correctly limited section
12(a)(2) to public communications, but wrongly excluded Aftermarket trading); Therese Maynard, A
Requiem: Reflections on Gustafson, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 1327, 1351 (1996) (arguing majority's
methodology jeopardizes securities-law interpretations by distorting statutes to achieve desired results);
cf Weiss, Further Thoughts, supra note 12, at 142, 149 (suggesting Court's reasoning was "silly" and
"puzzling"); Weiss, What Questions Remain, supra note 12, at 1210 (agreeing with outcome, but
criticizing breadth and approach of majority).
177. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 564.
178. See id. at 565.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 565-66.
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claims can arise only out of public offerings and not private stock
placements such as the one at issue in the case.' The Seventh Circuit
vacated that judgment and remanded based on another opinion it had
recently issued, in which it reasoned that the definition of prospectus was
properly interpreted as including all communications offering the sale of
securities"' and, therefore, covered the private-placement transaction at
issue.'
2. Majority Opinion
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit, holding that the Agreement was not a public-offering prospectus,
and could not, therefore, be the subject of a section 12(a)(2) claim.' The
majority focused on the definition of the term "prospectus" and narrowed its
definition by reviewing three sections of the Securities Act: section 10,
which sets forth the requisite information to be included in a prospectus for
a public offering;" 5 section 12(a)(2); and section 2(10), which contains
definitions.8 6
181. See Alloyd Co. v. Gustafson, No. 91-C-889 (N.D. Il. May 29,1992). The district court reasoned
that private-sale agreements, like the one at issue, are not comparable to public offerings because the
plaintiffs "had direct access to financial and other company documents, and had the opportunity to
inspect the seller's property." Ia The court relied on Balay v. LeggMason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d
682 (3d Cir. 1991).
182. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 1993).
183. See id& at595.
184. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 584. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent,
and was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See idl at 584-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote an additional dissent. See id. at 596-604 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994); see also Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568-78. Justice Thomas's
dissent takes issue with the majority's choice to consider the statute's definition section last rather than
first. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 585-87; see also infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
According to the Court, the relevant part of section 10 states:
Except to the extent otherwise permitted or required pursuant to this subsection or subsections (c),
(d), or (e) of this section-
(1) a prospectus relating to a security other than a security issued by a foreign government or
political subdivision thereof, shall contain the information contained in the registration
statement ...
(2) a prospectus relating to a security issued by a foreign government or political subdivision
thereof shall contain the information contained in the registration statement...
Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568-69 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)).
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The Court concluded that unless otherwise exempted by section 3 87 of
the Securities Act, section 10 requires that a prospectus provide the required
registration-statement information.'88 Section 10 does not define the term
prospectus, but the Court found that it does provide guidance as to what a
prospectus cannot be if the Securities Act "is to be interpreted as a
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, one in which the operative
words have a consistent meaning throughout."'89 Working backwards in this
manner, the Court first determined that, by definition, a prospectus must
include the information contained in a registration statement. ° Because the
Agreement did not contain the requisite information, the Court then
reasoned that it was not a prospectus under section 10.'9' The Court
concluded that only public offerings require registration statements; thus, a
section 10 prospectus can only be a document related to a public offering by
an issuer or its controlling shareholders. 92 Further, the Court stated that it
could meet its goal of providing the term with a consistent meaning
throughout the Securities Act only by establishing that the meaning of the
term prospectus was the same under both sections 10 and 12. 93
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(1994) (exempting governmental and certain other types ofsecurities from Act).
188. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id. The Court cautioned that sellers cannot prevent a document from being a prospectus by
omitting required information. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 570. The Court reviewed other sections of the statute, including section 12. See id at
571. The Court noted that section 12(a)(2) excludes government-issued securities, indicating that
Congress did not intend for liability to extend to any written communication relating to the sale of
securities. See id. at 571. Yet, according to the Court, there was "no ready explanation" for exempting
government securities, unless the term prospectus relates only to documents offering securities sold to
the public by an issuer. See id.
Next, the Court addressed the Act's definitional section, section 2(10), and stated that the plaintiffs'
argument rested primarily on one word of that section. See id. at 573. Section 2(10) reads:
The term "prospectus" means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the
sale of any security; except that (a) a communication sent or given after the effective date of the
registration statement (other than a prospectus permitted under subsection (b) of section 77j of this
title) shall not be deemed a prospectus if it is proved that prior to or at the same time with such
communication a written prospectus meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of section 77j of
this title at the time of such communication was sent or given to the person to whom the
communication was made, and (b) a notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication in
respect of a security shall not be deemed to be a prospectus if it states from whom a written
prospectus meeting the requirements of section 77j of this title may be obtained and, in Pddition,
does no more than identify the security, state the price thereof, state by whom orders will be
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The Court also reasoned that the primary purpose of the Act was to
create disclosure and registration obligations in connection with public
offerings. A restrictive interpretation of the term prospectus better "linked"
section 12(a)(2) to the duties created by the Securities Act.' Finally, the
Court turned to the legislative history of the Securities Act, noting that the
plaintiffs and the dissenters inappropriately relied on "statements by
commentators and judges written after the [Securities] Act was
passed .... ,,"s According to the Court, other contemporaneous statements
and congressional documents were consistent with its interpretation that
section 12(a)(2) was available only for public offerings. 96
executed, and contain such other information as the Commission by rules or regulations deemed
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors, and subject to such
terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, may permit.
15 U.S.C. § 77(10) (1994).
Focusing on the portion of section 2(10) which provides that "[t]he term 'prospectus' means any
prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television,
which offers any security for sale orconfirms the sale ofany security," the Court stated that the plaintiffs
"[c]oncentrat[ed]" on the word "communication." Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 573-74. According to the
Court, the plaintiffs argued that any written communication offering securities for sale was a prospectus.
Applying this definition to section 12(a)(2), the Court reasoned, would make any material misstatement
or omission in any communication offering a security for sale subject to those provisions. See id at 574.
Such an interpretation, according to the Court, would give the word prospectus a "capacious" and
"incompatible" definition for section 10. Id Instead, the Court reasoned, the term prospectus actually
refers to documents soliciting the public to buy securities. See idt To read the term communication
otherwise would make the terms, "notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter," which are all forms of
written communication, redundant and would indicate that the terms had no purpose. Id at 574-75.
The Court also applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis-a word is known by the company it keeps.
See id Applying this doctrine, the Court found that the terms "prospectus, notice, circular,
advertisement, [and] letter," refer to documents of wide circulation. Ma. at 575. In similarvein, the Court
reasoned that the inclusion of such terms as "radio or television" indicates that the word communication
was meant to refer to public communication. Md.
The Court also considered an earlier opinion in which it held that section 17(a) of the Act applies to
fraud in either initial distributions or ordinary market trading of securities. See d at 576-77 (citing
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979)). That opinion expanded section 17(a) to market trading,
in what the Gustafson Court termed a "departure" from the Securities Act's limitation to new offerings.
See iaL at 578. In Nafialin, the Court had relied on the absence of limiting language in section 17(a) and
contrasted the limiting language of "by means of a prospectus or oral communication" in section
12(a)(2). Id at 577.
194. IdM at 572.
195. Id at 578-79.
196. See id. at 579-83 (citing various legislative documents using term "public" when referring to
civil remedies).
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3. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Unlike the majority, Justice Thomas began his interpretation of section
12(a)(2) with the Act's definition section, section 2(10).' 97 According to
Justice Thomas, the "breadth" of the terms in section 2(10) left the majority
without an argument that the term "prospectus" applied only to public
offerings of securities. 98 He argued that by including the word prospectus
as one of the many types of documents qualifying as a prospectus, Congress
indicated its intent that the term be broader than its dictionary definition or
its definition as a term of art.' 9 Instead, in section 2(10), he reasoned,
Congress defined types of communications, not transactions. 2°°
197. See id. at 585 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 585-86.
199. See id. at 586.
200. See id. According to Justice Thomas, sections 3 and 4 set out exempted transactions. See id.
Thus, it was appropriate to use the definition of the term "prospectus" in section 2(10) to define that term
for the Securities Act. See id. Justice Thomas criticized the majority's reliance on noscitur a sociis,
noting that the majority used it "to create ambiguities in § 2(10)." Id. Instead, he argued, the canon
appropriately applies only when the statute is ambiguous, not when the statute is clear. See id According
to Justice Thomas, reading one word, prospectus, as controlling the other terms in the statute, "def[ies]
common sense." Id. at 587.
Justice Thomas conceded that other portions of the statute limit the term prospectus, particularly
section 10. See id. at 588. Although he agreed with the majority that generally terms should be given
the same meaning throughout the statute, he argued that the presumption is rebutted when, as here,
Congress has indicated otherwise. See id. For example, he argued that section 2(10) defines a
prospectus to include documents offering and confirming the sale of securities, but section 10
includes only the former. See id. This makes sense, he reasoned, because it would be "radical" to
require every confirmation slip to include all of the information required by section 10. Id. Further,
he noted, the preface to section 2 states that its six definitions apply "'unless the context otherwise
requires."' Id. at 588-89 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994)). Section 10's context, he reasoned, creates
the exception. See id. at 589.
Justice Thomas then turned to the text of section 12(2) and concluded that it also supported his
interpretation. See id. He noted that section 12(2) does not distinguish between initial public offerings
and other transactions. See id. at 589-90. Thus, he concluded, if Congress intended to distinguish them,
it could have done so by including language limiting the section to public offerings. See id. at 590.
Moreover, he pointed out, the absence oflimiting language in section 12(2) is striking when compared to
the specificity of section 4 exemptions. See id. at 591.
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Thomas rejected the majority's analysis of Naftalin, arguing the
opinion indicates that when the statutory language lacks limitations, the Court has held that the
Securities Act extends beyond public offerings. See id. at 592. Section 12(2), he argued, is similar to
section 17(a) in this respect and should, therefore, be interpreted similarly. See id. at 592-94.
Finally, Justice Thomas accused the majority of being "motivated by its policy preferences." Id at
594. He quoted two portions of the majority opinion indicating reluctance to expand liability under the
Act. See id. Then, he stated that the majority exceeded the bounds of its authority by questioning policy,
not simply applying it. See id. In doing so, he noted, the majority not only turned statutory-construction
methods upside down, but also "frustrat[ed] Congress's will." Id. at 595.
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4. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Thomas's language- and structure-
based arguments"' and argued that the statute's drafting history and its
longstanding scholarly and judicial interpretations contradicted the majority
opinion.' °2 In her view, the drafting history "is at least consistent with" the
argument that section 12(a)(2) is not limited to public offerings.2 3 She
reviewed the British Companies Act ("British Act") on which Congress
based the Securities Act, noting that it contained language limiting the
definition of a prospectus to communications "'offering [securities] to the
public." '  Congress borrowed its section 2(10) list of terms from the
British Act, she argued, but did not adopt its limiting language,0 5 indicating
by "conspicuous omission" that it intended the term to include more than
public-offering communications.0 6
She then pointed to the House Conference Report, asserting that it does
not indicate that section 12(a)(2) is limited to public offerings0 7 and that it
does not use the word "prospectus."2 Turning to commentators writing
shortly after the Act's passage, she concluded that they-some of whom
were involved in its drafting-understood the section to include public and
private offerings as well as resales.2' In addition, she noted that all of the
Courts of Appeal had agreed that section 12(a)(2) applies to private
201. Id at 596-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. Id at 599-604.
203. Id at 599.
204. Id (quoting British Companies Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (1929)); see also SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,123 (1953); Landis, supra note 14, at 34; Note, 20 Va. L. Rev. 451,456-58
(1934).
205. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 599-600.
206. Idat600.
207. See id (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, at 26-27(1933)). For analyses ofthe legislative history,
see Landis, supra note 14, at 29-49; Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the
SecuritiesActof1933forFraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 Win. &MaryL. Rev. 847,
870-92 (1991); Robert N. Rapp, The Proper Role of Securities Act Section 12(2) as an AJermarket
Remedy for Disclosure Violations, 47 Bus. Law. 711,715-16,719-27 (1992). For contemporaneous
discussions of the Act, see generally Douglas & Bates, supra note 14; Harry Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act,43 Yale L. 227 (1933); Arthur H. Dean, The Federal Securities Act: I, Fortune,
Aug. 1933, at 50; and Arthur H. Dean, The Federal Securities Act: 11, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 53.
208. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 600.
209. See id at 601-02.
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placements."' Thus, she concluded, section 12(a)(2) appropriately applies
to a private resale of securities.2 1
IV. THE EFFECT OF TRACING
A. The Tracing Requirement Prohibits Valid Claims
As defined and applied, the tracing requirement inappropriately limits the
reach of sections 11 and 12(a)(2) to Original Purchasers and thereby
undermines the statute's purpose."' The tracing requirement is a judicial
invention, created to implement the Second Circuit's interpretation of
section 11 as providing remedies to Offering Shareholders. Although the
interpretation was arguably correct given the statute's language and history,
the prescribed tracing approach actually diminishes the remedial purpose of
the statute. Indeed, the effect of the tracing requirement and Gustafson on
the accessibility of section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims to shareholders is
dramatic.
The Second Circuit's mistaken finding that the tracing requirement
would both prevent overinclusiveness and fulfill the statute's purpose has
resulted in scores of dismissed cases." 3 The Barnes court concluded that
only those section 11 shareholders who could trace their shares to the
offering at issue were entitled to a share of the class settlement.2"4 The court
210. See id. at 602. She does note, however, that the courts of appeals were divided as to whether
section 12(2) applied to Aftermarket purchases. See id.
211. See id. at 603.
212. See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967) (acknowledging, without
comment or analysis, shareholders' argument that preexisting shares make tracing impossible); In re
Eagle Computer Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,741, at 93,604 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1986)
(noting defendants' argument that second offering made it impossible for shareholders purchasing after
that offering to trace shares); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (rejecting
pleadings where plaintiff failed to plead facts connecting shares to offering documents and noting that
presence of other offerings made it impossible for court to make assumptions).
213. The courts often do not have to face the effect of their opinions because most find that
shareholders must allege they purchased their shares either in or pursuant to the offering at the motion-
to-dismiss or class-certification stage. Many courts specifically indicated that whether the shareholders
could meet the direct tracing requirement was best decided after discovery, thus allowing the
shareholders to gain a toehold in the litigation. See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 286
(3d Cir. 1992) (agreeing with lower court finding that "pursuant to" allegations were sufficient at "early
stage" of litigation); In re Seagate Tech. Sec. Litig., 115 F.R.D. 264, 267 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that
"pursuant to" allegation was all that was required for conditional class certification).
214. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 273.
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held that section 11 required this conclusion even if tracing might be
difficult.2"5 The court rejected the shareholders' plea to shift the burden of
traceability to the defendants, noting, ironically, that the shareholders had
not "demonstrated the unreasonableness of leaving th[e] burden on them." 216
A reexamination of the Barnes opinion reveals that without so stating, the
court made a choice between an underinclusive and an overinclusive
interpretation of section 11 and in so doing, undermined its purposes.217
Further, what began as an argument by the plaintiffs that the court should
not impose a tracing requirement because it was impossible for them to
meet has become an argument by defendants that courts should dismiss
section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims because plaintiffs cannot provide the
requisite proof of tracing.218 Of all the decisions surveyed for this Article,2"9
in only five cases were the shareholders possibly able to meet the direct-
tracing requirement." What began with Barnes as a shield to prevent non-
215. See id. at 272.
216. Id. at 273 n.2; see also supra note 111.
217. The difference is important. The purpose of deterring fraud in the securities market is to prevent
the phenomenon referred to as a "market for lemons." See generally George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor
"Lemons": Quality Uncertainty andthe Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. Econ. 488 (1970). In the securities
market, fraud is perceived as "bad" because it makes it difficult for investors to differentiate quality
securities from nonquality ones-well-managed companies and poorly run ones can sell their shares for
the same prices. See Lynn A. Stout, Type IError, Type HlError, and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 711, 713 (1996). As a result, increasing numbers of poorly managed
companies will enter the market until investors realize that market prices do not distinguish such
companies from their well-managed counterparts. Investors then lose confidence in all securities and
begin to discount them. See id When this happens, good firms leave the market because the market
prices for their securities are insufficient. The only companies left are those for whom the market price,
although low, is presumably higher than the value of the securities. See id An underinclusive
interpretation of the statute can encourage fraud and thereby contribute to a market for lemons. See id at
714. The key, of course, is to set the right limit See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure andthe Protection oflnvestors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669, 673 (1984) (stating that "[a]
world with fraud, or without adequate truthful information, is a world with too little investment, and in
the wrong things to boot"); cf Grant Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part V
Default, 7 Q. Rep. 4, 7 (1952) ("In this sort of situation there are always two extremes to be avoided.
One is setting the barriers against fraud so high that legitimate business operations are blocked. The
other is setting them so low that fraud flourishes unchecked.").
218. Compare Barnes, 373 F.2d at 270, with In re Eagle Computer Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,741, at 93,604 (NJD. Cal. Mar. 31, 1986).
219. This Article has attempted to include all of those opinions available in print and online as of
January 2000. Obviously, not all such opinions are published or online. Arguably, the stringency of the
tracing requirement may be partially responsible for the small number of claims because plaintiffs
unable to trace may refrain from filing claims.
220. See, e.g., In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-S-96-0708-PMP (RLII), 1998 WL
167259, at *21 (D. Nev. Apr. 2, 1998) (rejecting motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged purchases
directly in offering at issue); In re U.S.A. Classic Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
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Offering Shareholders from proceeding with section 11 claims has become
a sword in the hands of defendants, particularly since 1995, for both
sections 11 and 12(a)(2). Indeed, in one case, the defendants argued the
section 11 cause of action should be dismissed because shareholders who
purchased in an IPO probably sold their shares quickly and did not suffer
any losses. The argument is essentially that Original Shareholders do not
lose money, only Aftermarket Shareholders do.2 '
Stripped of its rhetoric, Barnes implemented an underinclusive
interpretation of section 11 and restricted access to a remedy Congress had
intended.222 In failing to consider the practical impossibility of the tracing
requirement, the court departed from the basic canon of statutory
interpretation-interpreting the statute to give it meaning. The court first
held that Congress intended for Aftermarket Shareholders to have a remedy
under section 11 and that the statute so provided.' Then the court created
the tracing requirement. When the Aftermarket Shareholders argued that
tracing was impossible because they would be precluded from accessing
the remedy the court had held should be available to them, the court
summarily rejected them. It only acknowledged, without any analysis, that
tracing might be difficult.2 4 By doing so, it denied those shareholders a
remedy.2
25
(CCH) $ 98,837 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (noting purchases on date of IPO); In re Kendall Square
Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Mass. 1994) (rejecting motion to dismiss where
shareholder purchased at offering price on offering date); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., 767 F.
Supp. 275,279 (D.D.C. 1991) (same); In re Data Access Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130,146 (D.N.J. 1984)
(stating that one plaintiffwas Original Purchaser); Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584,590 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (noting that named plaintiffs bought shares "on or about" offering date).
221. See In re Computron Software, Inc. See. Litig., No. CIV.A.96-1911 (AJI), 1998 WL 236232, at
*5 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 1998) (noting argument of defendants that Original Shareholders likely sold their
shares "long before" company disclosed problems and did not, therefore, suffer any loss). Of course, the
argument probably does not apply to small shareholders lucky enough to gain access to such an offering.
Those shareholders have probably been told that if they turn their shares around quickly-otherwise
known as "flipping" and the best way to ensure a profit-they will not gain access to any such future
offerings. See Andrew Siconolfi & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Brokers Press Small Investors to
Hold IPO Shares, Wall St. J., June 26, 1998, at Al.
222. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271-73. The court also stated that tracing was not necessary for section
12(a)(2) or section 17. See id. at 272.
223. See id. at 271-72.
224. See id. at 272.
225. See id.
464
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To understand the impossibility of the tracing requirement, one must
consider how offerings and the stock markets work. 6 Tracing should not
be an issue when the offering in question is an IPO. When a company offers
shares of stock to the market for the first time, those are the only shares
available. Thus, no matter when a shareholder buys securities, the securities
are from that offering.2 7
Yet, as applied by the courts, who have expanded it to section 12(a)(2),
the tracing requirement prohibits Offering Shareholders from accessing
either section even if only Offering Shares are on the market. For example,
in Stack v. Lobo,' the court dismissed the shareholders' section 12(a)(2)
claims, relying in part on the shareholders' failure to specify the
circumstances surrounding their purchases. 9 Yet, under the facts outlined
by the court, the only offering ever made by the company was an IPO; thus,
no matter when the shareholders purchased their shares, the shares were
presumably from that offering." Presumptively, then, the shares were
traceable. Or consider Mark v. Fleming Co., in which the court dismissed
the shareholder's section 11 claims because the shareholder did not allege
that he purchased in the offering. 2 The court's chronology of events
226. In 1933, when Congress passed the Securities Act, offerings were not always oversubscribed at
the offering date. Thus, it is arguable that tracing may have been possible, at least more often, then than
now. See, e.g., -LK Rep. No. 73-85, at 16 (1933) (stating that "average public offering has been
distributed within a year"). Now, however, changes in the market and underwriterpractices are arguably
further support for interpreting the provisions to provide remedies for all Offering Shares.
227. But see infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
228. 903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
229. See id at 1375.
230. See id at 1366 (mentioning only company's IPO). When reviewing the plaintiffs' amended
complaint, the court found that Gustafson prohibited the plaintiffs' claims because they purchased their
shares in the Aftermarket, not directly in the IPO. See id at 1374-76; see also Adair v. Bristol Tech.
Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (defining and discussing tracing even when only offering in
issue was IPO); In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,092, at
98,742 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993) (same); Budget Rent a Car Sys., Inc. v. Hirsch, 810 F. Supp. 1253,
1258 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (dismissing section 12(a)(2) claim where plaintiff failed to allege that securities
were purchased in offering, but facts describe only one offering of securities); cf. In re Computron
Software, Inc., No. 96-191 1(AJI), 1998 WL 236232 (D.NJ. Apr. 22, 1998) (discussing difficulty of
tracing in context of settlement opinion, but only one offering was noted in facts). But see In re U.S.A.
Classic Sec. Litig., [1995 TransferBinder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,837 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,1995)
(noting that where company had made only one public offering, standing at motion-to-dismiss stage
appeared clear); Pearlman v. Gennaro, No. 72 Civ. 2247,1973 WL 390, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 31,1973)
(presuming plaintiffs' shares were covered by registration statement when only one offering was
mentioned in facts).
23 1. No. CIV-96-0506-M (W.D. Okla. filed Mar. 27, 1998).
232. See id.
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revealed, however, that the company had made only one offering.33 The
court incorrectly denied the shareholder a remedy. By definition, he was an
Offering Shareholder and should not have had to go through the exercise of
tracing his shares. 34
With each additional offering, however, the number of shareholders who
can trace and sue for any one offering is increasingly limited. Brokers hold
shares of stock in general accounts.2 135 The shares are fungible . 36 Neither the
brokers nor the shareholders know which issue of a particular security is
being transferred. When a company makes a second offering of stock, the
only purchasers who know the offering origins of their securities are
Original Shareholders in either offering and those who purchased between
the first and second offerings. 237  Accordingly, under the tracing
requirement, they are the only shareholders who would have the opportunity
to sue." Shareholders who buy securities after the second offering will be
unable to trace their shares to either offering and therefore will never have
the benefit of sections 11 and 12(a)(2).239 And, correlatively, the deterrent
effect of the statute is reduced for companies who have made a second
offering of stock. 40 As a practical matter, the courts have created a perverse
incentive for companies and their underwriters to press forward with
follow-on and secondary offerings that sometimes occur within months of
233. See id.
234. But see Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 90,627, at 92,853 (9th Cir.
Aug. 27, 1999) (overruling Mark implicitly by holding that where only one offering had occurred,
traceability could be presumed).
235. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Most securities are held in "street name" or the name
of a beneficiary. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection
Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization ofFailure, 72 U.S.C. L. Rev. 1071,1073 & n.3 (1999).
Now, when securities are traded, the depository retains ownership and does not issue new certificates for
each trade. See id. Most securities are traded through a depository system, with certificates on deposit at
the Depository Trust Corporation (DTC) and registered under the name of Cede & Co., the DTC's
nominee. See id. "The vast majority of shares of major securities issues are on deposit at DTC and thus
are not held in the name of their beneficial owners." Id. Thus, stock held in street name can amount to as
much as 80% of an issuer's outstanding shares. See id.
237. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
238. Courts do not, however, assume that even these shareholders can trace. See supra notes 228-34
and accompanying text.
239. See Harden v. Raffensberger, Hughes & Co., 933 F. Supp. 763, 766 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (when
"securities of an identical kind (or of the same nature as those registered) were already traded on the
open market," plaintiffs must trace their shares).
240. See Scott Thurm, Juniper Planning Follow-On Offering After ]PO Success, Wall St. J., Sept. 2,
1999, at B7 (reporting that Juniper Networks, Inc. was planning "unusually quick follow-on offering" to
take place within three months of IPO).
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the IPOs and that make it impossible for most shareholders to trace and,
therefore, to sue under these sections.24
In addition, even shareholders savvy enough to try to preserve their
rights under the statute by requesting only covered securities are prevented
from accessing their statutory remedy. Brokers cannot promise to provide
only Offering Shares because of the fungibility of shares in brokerage
accounts.242 Accordingly, the shares received may or may not be Offering
Shares. And no matter what they receive, the purchasers cannot prove what
type of shares they own.243
Situations in which the shares in the second offering were of a different
type than those in the first are also affected by the way courts apply the
tracing requirement. Those offerings presumably covered only a certain
type of security, and therefore, it is possible to determine from which
241. See Harden, 933 F. Supp. at 766 (suggesting that questions of fact concerning tracing may be
difficult); Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870, 875-76 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (granting
summary judgment where defendants showed that tracing was impossible forplainiffs to prove); Lorber
v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (rejecting arguments that because tracing was
impossible to prove, court should not require it) (citing Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir.
1967)).
Moreover, the existence of shelf offerings further compounds the problem. These offerings are so
called because companies prepare the abbreviated registration materials in advance and then make the
offering when the company pinpoints the market date, allowing the company flexibility in raising
capital. See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1200 (1st Cir. 1996); see also SEC Form S-3,
item 11 (a). In part, the rationale for allowing such offerings is that eligible companies are subject to the
ExchangeAct's quarterly and annual reporting requirements. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1209. Yet, because of
certain limitations in Exchange Act regulations, a company can actually make such an offering without
disclosing certain information that is material but not yet regulatorily ripe. See Mitu Gulati, When
Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case ofInterim Non-Disclosure, 46
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 675, 681-88 (1999). Due to the manner in which courts apply tracing requirements,
Offering Shareholders who were harmed will be left without access to their section 11 and 12(a)(2)
remedies.
Consider the facts in Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210-11. Although it did not discuss tracing, the Shaw court
reviewed the interim disclosure problem. Digital Equipment Corp. made a shelf offering at a time when
the company had had several bad quarters but had recently enjoyed better revenue growth. See id) at
1199-200. Eleven days before the end of a quarter, the company made a $400 million shelf offering of
securities. One week later, the offering closed. See id. Three weeks later, the company announced that
instead of the predicted upturn, third-quarter revenues were down by $183 million. See id
The First Circuit denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in part because the shelf-offering timing
was suspicious. See id Though not raised, the tracing problem existed here and would have prevented
plaintiffs from accessing an important remedy.
242. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 226-41 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., In re ZZZ Best Sec. Litig., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,485, at 91,309-10 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 26, 1994) (noting that although securities of company were on market at time of alleged false
offering documents, documents covered warrants which were newly issued).
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offering the shares were issued simply by examining their type.245
Accordingly, it is also possible to determine who should have access to a
remedy. Yet, here as well, courts appear to require the plaintiffs to allege,
sometimes with specificity, that their shares were Offering Shares.2'
The presence of unregistered shares has the potential to complicate
further shareholders' access to a remedy. For example, some defendants
have argued that if, in addition to the IPO shares, unregistered shares
entered the market pursuant to Rule 144(k),247 Aftermarket Shareholders
cannot know whether their shares proceeded from registered or unregistered
shares and cannot, therefore, trace their shares.248 As a result, those
shareholders should be precluded from suing under these sections.2 This
argument, if accepted by courts, creates an incentive for defendants to sell
their unregistered shares as soon as they are allowed, again making it
impossible for shareholders to sue under these sections.
The tracing requirement also creates "accidental" standing.250 Consider
two shareholders who, at the same time and after an offering, buy shares in
a company already being traded on the open market. One receives newly
issued shares; the other receives previously issued shares. Assuming they
could trace their shares, the tracing requirement would provide the former,
but not the latter, with a remedy even if both bought because of offering
publicity.25' Applying the more stringent requirement which permits only
the Original Shareholders to sue allows fewer shareholders to state a claim
under either section, assuming arguendo that they could trace their shares.
Aftermarket Shareholders who, if allowed to allege traceability, could have
survived a motion to dismiss, and thereby engage in discovery,252 would
245. See id.
246. See, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 95,004, at 95,630 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 23, 1990) (defining and discussing tracing issue when company issued both common stock in
IPO and debentures in separate offering); cf. Mark v. Fleming, No. CIV-96-0506-M, slip op. at 3-6
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 27, 1998) (listing only one offering of fixed notes, but dismissing section 11 claim for
failure to plead traceability).
247. See, e.g., In re Masstor Sys. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-84-20599 RPA, 1986 WL 36310, at *i
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1986).
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. Judge Friendly conceded that this problem would occur, but stated that the court remained
"unpersuaded that, by departing from the more natural meaning of the words, a court could come up
with anything better." Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967).
251. See id.
252. See, e.g.,In reDataAccessSys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 146 (D.N.J. 1984) (noting that prior
to discovery, inability to trace did not preclude class certification).
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now be precluded from doing so. If a court strictly applies the Original-
Shareholder limitation, or if the company had previously issued shares of
the type issued in the new offering, even those shareholders who purchased
on the day of the offering would be left without a section 11 or 12(a)(2)
remedy.
Moreover, under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine," 3 any misstatement
or omission in a registration statement would affect all shareholders, new or
old.' Indeed, even though section 11 and 12(a)(2) plaintiffs need not prove
reliance, 5 such a misstatement might actually cause purchasers to attempt
to buy stock in an offering. Yet, no matter what prompts them to request
Offering Shares, in today's market average shareholders do not have access
to those shares. Instead, they are forced to buy in the Aftermarket."6 Thus,
even a shareholder who relied on a misstatement or omission would be
denied a remedy under the Securities Act.
To offset the restrictiveness of the tracing requirement, some courts have
referred shareholders to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, noting that those who could not trace their claims under
section 11 or 12(a)(2) were not denied a remedy entirely, but instead had to
pursue a different remedy.27 This argument is problematic because,
although sections 11 and 12(a)(2) are strict-liability and negligence causes
of action,"8 section 10(b) is scienter-based." 9 As a result, the Securities Act
claims should be easier to prove than their Securities Exchange Act
counterpart.2'6 Further, the Supreme Court required scienter for section
253. See supra note 90.
254. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-43 (1988) (finding that price of securities is
based on available material company information and that misleading statements defraud purchasers
regardless of reliance).
255. See supra notes 29, 47, and accompanying text
256. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., In re Summit Med. Sys., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068,1070-71 (D. Minn. June29,1998)
(finding only Original Shareholders had standing under Act and referring Aflermarket Shareholders to
10b-5); Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (noting that
plaintiffs faced with inability to meet tracing requirement could "still pursue" claims under lOb-5);
Langert v. Q-1 Corp., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCi) 94,445 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15,1974).
258. See supra notes 26,44, and accompanying text.
259. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
260. See Steven Thel, Essay: Section 12(2) ofthe Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63
Fordham L. Rev. 1183, 1184-85 (1995); see also Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading andDiscovery
Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act
Claims, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 537, 583 (1998) (arguing that pre-PSLRA courts incorrectly found that
Securities Act claims were subject to scienter-based standard and noting that PSLRA applies standard
only to Exchange Act claims).
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10(b) because, unlike sections 11 and 12(a)(2), it is a judicially implied
remedy.26' It is ironic therefore that the courts would prohibit shareholders
from accessing explicit, legislatively crafted remedies by referring them to a
more restrictive, judicially implied one.
The tracing requirement defeats Congress's attempt to create accessible,
strict-liability type claims. Congress created strict-liability and negligence
causes of action to deter misstatements in the documents corporations use to
raise capital.262 Presumably, Congress did so at the risk of eliminating some
"beneficial speech., 26  Congress was attempting to eliminate the
informational asymmetries that exist in this context." 4 Simply put, the
insiders have significant knowledge about the company that outsiders do
not. The Securities Act's disclosure provisions are one way in which
Congress attempted to rectify this situation for public offerings.26 Forcing
shareholders to prove a heavier burden of fraudulent intent defeats that
purpose.2
66
Indeed, the direct tracing requirement can undermine the statute's
nonreliance-based remedies. Neither section 11 nor section 12(a)(2)
requires shareholders to prove reliance on the alleged misstatement or
omission,"' but the tracing requirement operates to limit the shareholders'
claims. By not requiring proof of reliance, Congress made class actions
possible, thereby maximizing the deterrent effect of these sections.
Requiring proof of direct traceability, however, undercuts the statute's
power by effectively requiring reliance as an element.
261. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197.
262. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law ofFraud in Impersonal Markets, 78
Va. L. Rev. 623,630 (1992) (describing social costs of misstatements as including wealth transfers from
plaintiff to defendant and incentives for defendants to invest in lying or make decisions that result in
inefficient allocations of wealth); Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1999); see also Sale, supra note 260, at 590.
263. Mahoney, supra note 262, at 647-48 (noting that imposing liability for innocent and negligent
misstatements can result in ove-deterring speech, even beneficial speech).
264. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
Yale L.J. 239, 267-68 (1984); Letsou, supra note 58, at 125; Sale, supra note 260, at 592; see also
James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit
Procedures, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 745,746-48 (1984) (discussing agency theory and informational
asymmetry problems).
265. See Letsou, supra note 58, at 125; Sale, supra note 260, at 592.
266. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
267. See supra notes 28, 47, and accompanying text.
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Additionally, the Acts' provisions "involve distinct causes of action and
were intended to address different types of wrongdoing."268 To say that the
same claim may be actionable under both statutes is not the same as saying
that one substitutes for the other.2' Indeed, Congress added section 10(b) in
1934, without eliminating sections 11 and 12(a)(2); thus, presumably, it did
not intend section 10(b) to be a replacement for those sections. Moreover,
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) impose liability, and thereby due-diligence
responsibilities, on defendants whose conduct is not otherwise subject to
suit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Liability under the latter is limited
to those who make an alleged misstatement or omission, or "speakers.""27
Section 11, however, specifically extends liability to other persons involved
in an offering. By doing so, section 11 seeks, through the enforcement of
those due-diligence obligations, to deter misstatements and omissions in the
offering process.272 Referring shareholders to section 10(b) does not
advance that purpose.
In further support of the tracing requirement, the Barnes court pointed to
the provisions of sections 11 (g) and 1 l(e).2' Both place limits on damages
tied to the offering price, not the purchase price, of the security.274 These
provisions, the court found, "point[ed] in the direction" of limiting section
11 to Offering Shareholders. 5 Otherwise, it reasoned, the total "recovery
would be diluted" by non-offering claimants, particularly when the new
issue was relatively small.276 This argument fails to address the
268. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381.
269. See k at 383; cf Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 Chi. L. Rev. 611, 636-37 (1985) (arguing that stringent remedies are appropriate in stock-
issuance cases where allocative efficiency loss from misstatement or omission is most significant and
where measurement ofdamages is "exceptionally difficult," thus appropriately burdening defendant with
any uncertainty); see also Mahoney, supra note 262, at 633 (arguing that fraud in issuance market results
in misdirection of capital to issuer and, therefore, has more severe allocative impact than when it occurs
in Aftermarket).
270. Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 710 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting elements of section 10(b)
claim, including that plaintiffmust identify defendant who made alleged misstatement or omission).
271. See supra notes 19-23 and accompany text.
272. Seesupra notes33-38 and accompanying text; see also Hertzbergv. Dignity Partners, Inc., Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,627, at 93,851-52 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 1999) (noting that section I 1 applies to
persons other than issuers); Versyss Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 982 F.2d 653, 657 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that section 11 "readily impos[es] liability on ancillary parties to the registration statement (like
accountants) for the benefit of purchasers").
273. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
274. See supra notes 39-40, 64-66, and accompanying text.
275. Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272.
276. Id.
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underinclusive nature of the court's interpretation. As it pointed out, these
provisions reveal that Congress contemplated Aftermarket Shareholders277
sharing in the damages. In any case other than that involving only an IPO,
however, the impossibility of tracing their securities eliminates exactly
those plaintiffs.27
In support of its interpretation, the Barnes court noted that the section 11
penalty was so stringent and accessible that Congress must have intended it
to be available only to Offering Shareholders. 79 Yet, Congress's primary
concern was to deter companies from committing fraud, or to force them to
make full and accurate disclosures. 20 Viewed in that light, the better
interpretation would have been one providing as many Offering Shareholders
as possible with access to this remedy, not just Original Shareholders.2 ' The
court could have chosen an interpretation consistent with that intent, albeit an
overinclusive one.282
The Barnes court's review of the statute's legislative history also
elucidates the expansive purpose of the statute. The court pointed to the
language in the legislative history: "'In case any such statement shall be
false in any material respect, any persons acquiring any securities to which
such statement relates, either from the original issuer or any other person'
shall have a cause of action. 2 3 This language, the court argued, clearly
indicated that Congress intended a remedy for Aftermarket Shareholders.2
The court then eliminated access to the remedy by requiring tracing-an
inconsistent and insufficient solution.
Finally, the court's failure to address the impossibility of the direct
tracing requirement belies its protest that it could do no better with the
277. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
279. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272.
280. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (stating that purpose of
Securities Act is to provide "full disclosure [for] public offerings .... to protect investors against fraud,
and... to promote ethical standards or honesty and fair dealing"); S. Rep. No. 47, at 128 (1933)
(purpose of bill is to prevent "further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and
worthless securities through misrepresentations... [and] ... protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by
honest presentation"). Indeed, one purpose of the Securities Act was to remedy some of the deficiencies
in the protection afforded by common-law fraud claims. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
281. See Williams, supra note 262, at 1227 (stressing that purpose of Securities Act is to subject
companies' capital-raising efforts to public scrutiny, thereby forcing truthfulness in those efforts).
282. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
283. Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272.
284. See id. at 273.
Vol. 75:429, 2000
Disappearing Without a Trace
statute. The court could have devised a means by which Aftermarket
purchases could meet the tracing requirement. Although such an approach
might have been overinclusive, it would have correctly implemented the
statute and fulfilled the statute's purpose.
B. The Courts'Deployment of Gustafson Has Exacerbated the Effect
of the Tracing Requirement
Since 1995, defendants have aggressively employed Gustafson to limit
further shareholders' access to sections 11 and 12(a)(2) by allowing them to
plead traceability. They argued that the Gustafson Court held that liability
for misstatements and omissions attaches only to securities for which either
a registration statement or, as defined in that opinion, a prospectus was
required and only for those securities purchased in the public offering."'
Thus, in the context of section 12(a)(2) liability, defendants have argued
that Aftermarket Shareholders are indistinguishable from owners of
securities in a private-placement transaction-neither is entitled to section
12(a)(2) and, by extension, section 11 remedies." 6 This reading of
Gustafson is based, in part, on earlier opinions in which courts had held that
section 12(a)(2) did not extend to any Aftermarket transactions, even those
involving Offering Shares.8 7 Under this public-offering view, only the
limited class of Original Shareholders would be able to sue under section
12(a)(2).
The impact of Gustafson on section 12(a)(2) claims has been dramatic. In
some cases decided after Gustafson, courts have found that tracing is no
longer an option and that only Original Purchasers can sue under section
12(a)(2)." s For example, one court used Gustafson to dismiss, without leave
285. See, eg., Saslaw v. Askari, No. 95 Civ. 7641 (LAP), 1997 WL 221208, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
1997).
286. See id.
287. See supra note 167.
288. See In re Valence Tech. See. Litig., No. C 95-20459 JW, 1996 WL 37788, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 23, 1996) (dismissing section 12(a)(2) claims for failure to allege purchases in public offering and
finding that 12(a)(2) applies only to transactions that require delivery ofprospectus and that Gustafson
made tracing irrelevant); Weinstein v. Media Vision Tech. See. Litig., No. C 94-1015 EFL, 1995 WL
787549, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995) (holding that Gustafson appears to eliminate 12(a)(2)
plaintiffs who are Aftermarket purchasers). ButseeIn re Paracelsus Corp. See. Litig., Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 90,172, at 90,559-60 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 1998) (finding pursuant-to allegations sufficient to
withstand motion to dismiss of 12(aX2) claim); Schoenhautv. American Sensors, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 785,
789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); In re U.S.A. Classic Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,837 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (same).
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to plead or prove tracing, claims brought under section 12(a)(2), noting
(without deciding) that Gustafson might be read to eliminate the possibility
of tracing for section 11 claims as well.289 Others have noted that section
12(a)(2), but not section 11, claims might now be limited to Original
Shareholders.2 Further, in some cases, the shareholders have "conceded"
that Gustafson eliminates even the possibility of tracing for section 12(a)(2)
claims.29'
The post-Gustafson opinions on section 11 are split almost evenly
between those allowing tracing and those finding that only Original
Shareholders can sue.292 Before Gustafson, more courts allowed tracing for
section 11 claims than for section 12(a)(2) claims.293
Since Gustafson, however, many courts have arguably undermined the
deterrent effect of the Securities Act by finding that Aftermarket
Shareholders are no longer entitled to trace purchases under either section,
289. See Saslaw, 1997 WL 221208, at *4-5, *7 (dismissing section 12(a)(2) claims based on
Gustafson's majority opinion but noting that arguments that Gustafson's dissenting opinion supported
dismissal of section I 1 claims were persuasive).
290. See, e.g., In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,334, at 91,591 (D.
Conn. Oct. 22, 1998) (noting logic of Supreme Court's interpretation of section 12(a)(2) did "not
necessarily" apply to section 11); see also Schwartzv. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 178 F.RLD. 545,555-
56 (D. Colo. 1998). The court also considered other provisions of section 11 and its legislative history,
discussed above. See Schwartz, 178 F.R1D. at 556 & n.7; see also In re Number Nine Visual Group
Tech. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 90,504, at 92,448-49 (D. Mass. June 1, 1999) (noting that
although Aftermarket Purchasers may sue under section 12(a)(2), they are limited by the privity
requirement); supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
291. See Fazio & Fazio Living Trust v. Palmieri et al., No. C96-1096D, slip. op. at 7 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 10, 1997).
292. Compare supra note 290, with supra note 163.
293. See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272,286-87 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs must
address tracing in context of section 11 claim but not discussing tracing in analysis of section 12(a)(2)
claim). Compare supra note 163 (collecting cases requiring tracing for section I I claims), with supra
note 164 (collecting cases requiring tracing for both).
It is possible that the courts did so because section 12(a)(2) claims could be eliminated through the
application ofthe privity doctrine. See supra note 165 (collecting cases requiring tracing for section 11
claims and discussing 12(a)(2) claims in privity context). This doctrine, originally applied to section
12(1), requires purchasers to allege and prove privity with the sellers of the securities at issue. See Pinter
v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,641-55 (1988); see also Note, Applying Section 12(2) ofthe 1933 Securities Act
to the Aftermarket, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 955, 962 (1990). As applied by the courts, this doctrine can be
restrictive, thereby limiting the availability of a section 12(a)(2) claim. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1214-15 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that only underwriters are sellers in firm-
commitment offering); see also Patricia A. O'Hara, Erosion ofthe Privity Requirement in Section 12(2)
ofthe Securities Act of] 933: The Expanded Meaning ofSeller, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 921,930 (1984). As
a result, courts may properly have resolved such claims without discussing tracing. Cf. In re Number
Nine Visual Group Tech. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 90,504, at 92,448 & n.7 (D. Mass. June
1, 1999) (noting privity requirement of section 12(a)(2) may limit standing to Original Purchasers).
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which has resulted in a decrease in the number of shareholders even able to
argue that they are entitled to the Securities Act's explicit remedies.2'
Some courts have reached this conclusion by relying on dicta in
Gustafson.295 For example, in Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp.,296
the court found that Gustafson's holding rested on the distinction between a
public offering and a private transaction.297 It then stated that the Court's
"dicta provide[d] strong support' for dividing share purchases into two
categories-those purchased in an offering and those purchased in the
Aftermarket. 298 In support of its reading, the Murphy court cited the
Supreme Court's references to the Securities Act's role in regulating the
disclosure of information in the public-offering context, as well as other
comments, including the Court's statement that "'liability imposed by
section 12[(a)](2) cannot attach unless there is an obligation to distribute the
prospectus in the first place."' 29 Thus, the Murphy court concluded that
only Original Shareholders could maintain suits under either section."
In another case, the court applied the twenty-five-day purchase rule to
the shareholders' section 12(a)(2) claims, finding that none of the
294. See, e.g., In re SummitMed. Sys., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068,1070-71 (D. Minn. 1998) (reading
Gustafson as eliminating tracing option and requiring, for both sections, that plaintiffs purchase in
offering, and dismissing claims of Aftermarket purchasers); In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,560, at 97,789-90 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997) (same); Murphy v. Hollywood
Entertainment Corp., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,241, at 95,345-46 (D. Or. May 9,1996) (same); cf.
Fazio, slip. op. at 7 (finding that Gustafson eliminated tracing for 12(a)(2) claims and that section 11
requires purchasers in offering); In re Valence Tech. See. Litig., No. C 95-20459 JW, 1996 WL37788,
at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1996) (dismissing section 12(a)(2) claims for failure to allege purchases in
public offering and finding that 12(a)(2) applies only to transactions that require delivery of prospectus
and that Gustafson made tracing irrelevant); Weinstein v. Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,958, at 93,621 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995) (finding that Gustafson appeared to eliminate
12(a)(2) plaintiffs who are Aftermarket purchasers).
295. See, eg., Summit Med, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (noting that Gustafson touched only
"tangentially" on issue of standing of section 11 plaintiffs and stating that Supreme Court referred, "in
dicta, to the same interpretation being applied to both sections 11 and 12(a)(2)"); see also Murphy, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 95,345-46 (noting that Gustafson dicta provided "strong support for finding a
clear dividing line" between shares purchased in offering and those in purchased in Aftermarket);
Weinstein, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH), at 93,621 (stating that Gustafson "strongly suggests" that 12(a)(2)
plaintiffs may not be Aftermarket purchasers).
296. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,241, at 95,345 (D. Or. May 9, 1996).
297. Id.
298. See id
299. Id (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,571 (1995)). This same language, however,
can easily be interpreted to expand the class ofplaintiffs-including at least those to whom aprospectus
was sent or to whom the seller had an obligation to send a prospectus. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
300. See Murphy, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 95,346.
Washington Law Review Vol. 75:429, 2000
shareholders had purchased their shares within twenty-five days of the
offering and dismissed the claims.3"' Further, the court found that Gustafson
limited section 11 claims to Original Shareholders.3 2
Some courts have found, however, that Gustafson's holding is more
limited and does not eliminate tracing.0 3 One court simply stated its
301. See Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1374-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Brosious v.
Children's Place Retail Stores, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) $ 90,651, at 93,033 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 1999);
supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
302. See Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1374-76; see also Brosious, 90,651, at 93,033 (limiting section I 1
standing to Original Purchasers); Feiner v. SS&C Techs. Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251-53 (D. Conn.
Mar. 23, 1999) (stating that 12(a)(2) shareholders entitled to receiving prospectus can maintain claims);
Levitin v. A Pea in the Pod, Inc., No. 3:94-CV-0247-D, 1997 WL 160184, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
1997) (applying prospectus-delivery-period rationale to 12(a)(2) claim). Butsee Weinstein v. Jain, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 98,958, at 93,621 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995) (expressing skepticism about
prospectus-delivery period extending possible period for offering purchasers, but allowing plaintiff leave
to replead).
303. For section 11 claims, see Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,627,
at 92,852 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 1999) (holding Aftermarket Shareholders who can trace are entitled to
pursue remedy undersection 11); Salomon Smith Barneyv. Asset Securitization Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 9 90,723, at 93,492 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1999) (finding secondary-market participants who can
trace have standing and refusing to construe Gustafson as eliminating tracing option); Danis v. USN
Communications, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 90,692, at 93,283 (N.D. fI. Oct. 6, 1999) (same); In re
Number Nine Visual Group Technology Securities Litigation, 51 F. Supp. 2d I (D. Mass. June 1, 1999)
(noting tracing remains viable for sections I 1 and 12(a)(2)); Feiner, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53 (noting
traceability applied to section 11 claims and applying prospectus-delivery-period limitation to section
12(a)(2) claims); In re Fine Host Corp. Securities Litigation, 25 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Conn. 1998)
(allowing tracing of section 11 claims and noting that privity limits section 12(a)(2) claims); In re
Websecure, Inc. Securities Litigation, 182 F.R.D. 364 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding traceability for section
11 claims survived Gustafson but did not discuss it in section 12(a)(2) context); Schwartz v. Celestial
Seasonings, Inc., 178 F.RD. 545, 554-57 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding that notwithstanding Gustafson,
section 11 covers persons both buying "in" offering and acquiring securities "traceable" to offering);
Adairv. Bristol Technology Systems, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that law of
Second Circuit for 30 years had allowed tracing for section 11 and Gustafson did not change it) (citing
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967)); In re Stratosphere Corp. Securities Litigation, I
F. Supp. 2d 1096 (D. Nev. 1998) (finding that standing under section 11 requires purchase in, or
traceability to, public offering, and disagreeing with other courts which had found that Gustafson
eliminated tracing) (citing Gould v. Harris, 929 F. Supp. 353 (C.D. Cal. 1996)); Coplandv. Grumet, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 190,158, at 90,468 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1998) (granting shareholders leave to replead and
allege traceability); Schoenhaut v. American Sensors, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 785, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding allegations of traceability sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss); In re Numerex Corp.
Securities Litigation, 913 F. Supp. 391,395 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (assuming, for purposes ofmotion, that
plaintiffs could trace shares to offering); and Lilley v. Charren, 936 F. Supp. 708, 715-16 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (allowing plaintiffs leave to replead dates and circumstances of trades). Cf Stack, 903 F. Supp. at
1375-76 (applying Gustafson to dismiss section 12(a)(2) and 11 claims where plaintiffs neither
purchased in offering nor alleged traceability); In re Valence Tech. Securities Litigation, No. C-95-
20459-JW, 1995 WL 798927, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 1995) (same). But see Harden v.
Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 933 F. Supp. 763,766-67 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating that if shares existed
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disagreement with the post-Gustafson cases eliminating the "well-
established rule" allowing Aftermarket Shareholders to pursue traceable
claims." Another court within the Second Circuit noted that tracing had
been the law there for thirty years, 5 and that Gustafson neither discussed a
section 11 nor a public-offering claim.306 The final substantive paragraph of
Gustafson, however, does state such a limit. There, the Court said:
In sum, the word "prospectus" is a term of art referring to a document
that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling
shareholder. The contract of sale, and its recitations, were not held out
to the public and were not a prospectus as the term is used in the 1933
Act.307
In rejecting the argument that Gustafson does not eliminate tracing,
courts have faced language in the Gustafson dissents.3" For example, in
Adair v. Bristol Technologies,3°9 the court noted Justice Ginsburg's
statement that "there is no dispute that... [section 11] appl[ies] only to
public offerings-or to be more precise, to transactions subject to
on market prior to offering, section 11 is unavailable as a remedy and indicating, at least by inference,
that only purchasers ofIPO shares have remedy).
For section 12(a)(2) claims, see In re Paracelsus Corp. Securities Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
90,172, at 90,559 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 1998) (finding pursuant-to allegations sufficient to withstand
motion to dismiss); Schoenhaut, 986 F. Supp. at 789-90 (same); and In re U.S.A. Classic Securities
Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,837, at 93,046-47 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1995) (same).
304. Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (referring to Gustafson in section 11 context); see also
Johnson v. Mutual Sav. Bank, No. 95-C-2379, 1996 WL 79414, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1996) (noting
that Gustafson does not require plaintiffs to allege purchases in offering and stating that allegations of
purchasespursuant o offering are sufficient).
305. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 130-3 1.
306. See id.; see also Salomon Smith Barney, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII), at 93,492 (finding Gustafson
extended only to private-placement transactions, not public offerings); Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 555-56
(noting that Gustafson did not address, in dicta or otherwise, scope of section 11); U.S.A. Classic, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 93,046 (noting that Gustafson addressed private offering, but offering in this case
was public).
307. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,584 (1995).
308. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132. But see In re Summit Med. Sys., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070
(D. Minn. 1998) (noting that dissenting opinions supported dismissal of section 11 claims where
plaintiffs did not purchase in IPO); Vande Walle v. Salomon Brothers, Inc., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,577, at 97,857 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2,1997) (noting that fourdissenting Justices "agreed" that section 11
applied only to offering shareholders); In re WRT Energy See. Litig., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,560,
at 97,790 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997) (noting that both Gustafson majority and dissents support limiting
standing for both sections to Offering Shareholders); Saslaw v. Askari, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,461, at 97,055-56 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,1997) (dismissing section 12(a)(2) claims based on Gustafson
majority; noting arguments that dissent supported dismissal of section 11 claims was persuasive).
309. Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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registration."3t The defendants argued that this language, in combination
with the majority opinion, supported their contention that after Gustafson,
only Original Shareholders could sue under section I L'" The court
disagreed. Rather than limiting the cause of action to Original Shareholders,
the court found that taken in context, the statement cited by the defendants
supported only Justice Ginsburg's view that section 12(a)(2) was not
limited to public offerings and that section 11 was.3? 12 That issue, the court
noted, was not in dispute. Further, the court found Justice Ginsburg's
comment did not go so far as to limit the availability of the cause of action
to only those purchasing in an offering." 3
The court then turned its attention to the defendants' deployment of
Justice Thomas's dissent, finding that they had taken portions of his opinion
out of context as well." 4 Specifically, the court referred to a comment by
Justice Thomas that "issuers" are specifically delineated under section 11
and not under section 12(a)(2). The court found that Justice Thomas used
this statement to support only his contention that section 1 l's registration-
statement reach was more limited than section 12(a)(2)'s prospectus
reach.3"' Again, the court noted that this issue-who the proper defendants
were-was not in dispute, nor was the fact that the offering in question was
public.316 Thus, the court found, the statement was consistent with retaining
the option to trace for Aftermarket Shareholders." 7
Next, the court considered the defendants' construction of the Securities
Act's legislative history which, the defendants argued, supported their view
that section 11 applied only to Original, and not Aftermarket,
Shareholders." 8 The court noted that the same legislative history indicated
that section 11 remedies apply "regardless of whether [plaintiffs] bought
their securities at the time of the original offer or at some later date."319 The
court concluded that the legislative history was, therefore, "at best
310. Id. (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 600 n.4 (1995)).
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. Seeid.
314. See id.
315. Seeid.
316. Seeid.
317. See id. at 133.
318. See id. at 132 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, at 5 (1933)).
319. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, at 5 (1933)).
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ambiguous" as to whether tracing was available for Aftermarket
Shareholders 2
The court then argued that the text of the statute supported the conclusion
that Gustafson did not eliminate the tracing doctrine.32' Specifically, the
court pointed out that the language of section 11 is "broad," and that the
statute opens its remedy to "any person acquiring such securit[ies]." 322 Next,
it noted that section 11 (a) contains a special provision for persons acquiring
securities after the issuer has filed what is commonly referred to as an
annual report.3z Under section 11(a), such persons must prove actual
reliance on the alleged misstatement or omission.324 This provision, the
court concluded, indicated that in crafting the remedy under section 11,
Congress "contemplated" that the plaintiffs could purchase registered
securities at least a year after the date of an offering.
31
The court also noted that section 11 (e), which sets forth the formula for
calculating damages, firther supported its conclusion that Aftermarket
Shareholders may sue pursuant to section 1 1.326 The court reasoned that
section 11(e) reveals that Congress contemplated coverage for purchases
made in the Aftermarket by providing plaintiffs with damages calculated at
prices other than the offering price.327 Accordingly, the court found the
statute provided for a remedy for Aftermarket Shareholders.328
C. Tracing Should Be Reexamined
The time has come to reexamine the tracing requirement. Although it has
been in existence for over thirty years, no court has ever offered an
alternative to the tracing requirement as defined and applied by the Second
Circuit inBarnes. Indeed, the courts have simply adopted a requirement that
was initially nearly impossible to meet, but never fully examined as such.
As a result, the expansion of the tracing requirement has eliminated from
320. Seei.
321. Seekl
322. Id.
323. See id The statute states that if "a person acquired the security after the issuer has made
generally available to its security holders an earnings statement covering a period of at least twelve
months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement. . . ." Id
324. See id
325. lId
326. See i at 133.
327. See id
328. See id
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the statute's protection the very plaintiffs courts have found the statute was
designed to protect.1 9 The way courts have applied Gustafson has further
limited the plaintiffs who may have remedies under sections 11 and
12(a)(2), potentially undermining the deterrent purpose of the 1933 Act.330
In part, the lack of discussion of tracing may be due to the relative dearth
of opinions involving Securities Act claims. For example, in the first thirty-
five years of the statute's life, companies filed over 30,000 registration
statements with the SEC.33' In the same time period, only two such cases
were tried to a conclusion.332 Published settlements involving opinions exist
for only six cases.333 The small number of such settlements is striking, and it
is further limited by the availability of reported and electronic-database
opinions. Now, the courts' deployment of Gustafson further threatens to
erode any remaining claims and, thereby, the deterrent value in the
statute.334 Thus, the time has also come to reexamine how and whether
Gustafson applies to the tracing doctrine.
To begin with, those courts employing Gustafson to limit claims to those
of Original Shareholders have interpreted Gustafson in a way that could
defeat the stated purpose of sections 11 and 12(a)(2)-deterring fraud-like
behavior.35 Gustafson focused on the difference between private and public
329. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,469 (1897) (arguing
that "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.").
330. It is worth noting that, to the author's knowledge, no empirical evidence exists to show whether
issuers and underwriters actually proceed on the assumption that if they misspeak, they will suffer few, if
any, consequences because of the tracing requirement. The same lack of evidence applies to whether
attorneys advise them that, given the tracing requirement, few if any plaintiffs would succeed in a suit
for any such misstatement or omission. Cf Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal
Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663 (1989) (describing and
quoting database of conversations between family-law lawyers and clients).
331. See 9 Loss & Seligman, supra note 28, at 4272.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. When Congress passed the PSLRA, it made several revisions to both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
See, e.g., Sale, supra note 260, at 586-88 (summarizing changes). Although it changed the pleading
standard for section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 claims, it did not make any such changes for 1933 Act claims.
See id. at 583-93; see also In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 314-16 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that heightened pleading standards are inapplicable to 1933 Act claims). Indeed, the only
revision to the 1933 Act that changed sections 11 or 12(a)(2) was the provision allowing defendants to
invoke a loss-causation defense to damages under section 12. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (1994). The
reforms were responsive to the pleas of both the courts and the industry. See Sale, supra note 260, at
552-56.
335. See supra notes 14-16, 24-26, and accompanying text.
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sales of securities. The Court discussed offerings and Aftermarket
purchases, but did not address the tracing requirement or even section I V336
Indeed, given that the questioned transaction was a private purchase, tracing
and Aftermarket purchases were not even at issue. Moreover, the Court's
goal in defining the term prospectus narrowly was to establish a consistent
definition, not to prevent Aftermarket Shareholders from bringing claims."'
Given the above, using Gustafson to limit access to the remedies under
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) by further restricting the tracing requirement is
inappropriate. 338
336. See Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 90,692, at 93,282 (N.D. Il.
Oct. 6, 1999) (noting Gustafson dealt with section 12(a)(2), not section 11); In re Cendant Corp. See.
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,708, at 93,391 (D.NJ. July 27, 1999).
337. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
338. The critical nature of the commentaries on the opinion indicates that courts would do well to
refrain from expanding its reach. For example, Professor Peter Letsou argues that the Court should have
limited itself to a holding that would have precluded buyers who are able to "fend for themselves" or
who have access to the same information as mandated through section 12(a)(2), but which would not
necessarily exclude open-market purchasers from the remedy. Letsou, supra note 58, at 123-33 (citing
SEC v. Ralston Purina,'346 U.S. 119,125-26 (1953)). According to Letsou, such a holding would have
been consistent with the text of section 12(a)(2), its relationship to the Act, its legislative history, and
economic theories. See il at 133-46. In support of his contentions, Letsou notes, for example, that when
Congress was drafting the 1933 Act, it was responding to the stock-market crash. See id. at 140-41. The
legislative history reveals Congress's concern about public transactions and, correlatively, to the extent
that Congress intended to limit the application of section 12(a)(2), any implied limitation should extend
only to private transactions. See id. at 141.
In his economic-theory argument, Letsou notes that federal remedies such as those provided in the
Securities Act enable parties to reach agreements about purchase price where informational asymmetries
might otherwise prevent such an outcome. See id at 146-52. Parties can eliminate these asymmetries
through direct access to, and analysis ot company information. See id The Securities Act addresses
these asymmetries by creating an incentive for issuers to provide truthful and accurate information to the
public market through underwriters, thus eliminating the information gap. See id. at 150-52.
Consequently, public purchasers who cannot fend for themselves may rely on section 12(a)(2) to enforce
the information-provision requirement. See il; see also Sale, supra note 260, at 590-92. The same
informational-asymmetry problem does not, however, apply to private purchasers who have the
opportunity and resources to investigate the company's documents; thus, those purchasers do not need
access to section 12(a)(2). See Letsou, supra note 58, at 125-34; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 217, at 674-80.
Professor Stephen V. Bainbridge also criticizes the Supreme Court's Gustafson opinion, calling it the
"most poorly-reasoned, blatantly results-driven securities opinion in recent memory." Bainbridge, supra
note 11, at 1231-32. He criticizes the majority's analytical approach, finding fault, for example, with its
refusal to use the definition section to ascertain the meaning of the term "prospectus." See id. at 1235-
42. He argues that public policy concerns drove the Court's opinion, particularly a perception that the
Acts were being overused by aggressive plaintiffs' attorneys, who were filing "vexatious often
frivolous" cases. See ia& at 1254; see also Fiflis, supra note 176, at 428-32 (noting that Court
disregarded plain meaning of statute and assumed law-making role of Congress to implement public
policy) (citing Thel, supra note 260).
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Congress designed sections 11 and 12(a)(2) to act as a strong deterrent to
what it perceived to be the outrageously fraudulent behavior of issuers prior
to the Act.339 These sections were designed to eliminate the informational
asymmetries inherent in the public-offering context by requiring companies
to make full and accurate disclosures of specified company information
before selling securities to the public. These disclosures enable purchasers
to evaluate the company before purchasing such securities.'' Companies
selling securities to the public without making the accurate disclosures
ordered by these sections are engaging in conduct similar to insider
trading.34' Accordingly, these sections function like the insider-trading
disclose-or-abstain rule.342 Further, those who suffer a loss due to a
misstatement or omission are accorded strict-liability and negligence-like
remedies precisely because Congress deemed the protection of capital
raising to be worthy of such strict remedies.
Before Gustafson, shareholders usually survived motions to dismiss or
oppositions to class certification because courts did not expect them to
Moreover, Bainbridge notes that Gustafson leaves several issues unsettled. See Bainbridge, supra note
11, at 1258-60. For example, the ambiguity in the Court's treatment of the term "public offering" means
that readers now do not know whether "public offering" refers to primary and secondary transactions or
public and private transactions. See id. at 1259. Bainbridge concludes that the most straightforward
reading of the statute indicates that section 12(a)(2) applies to all primary-market transactions. See id. at
1259-60.
Professor Theresa Maynard argues that the Gustafson opinion is likely to have a "profound" impact on
the practice of securities law. Maynard, supra note 176, at 1327. Specifically, she notes that the Court's
methodology is a "dramatic shift" from its prior approach to interpretations ofsecurities law. Id. at 1328.
By skipping the Act's definitional section and contriving its own definition for the term prospectus, the
Court shifted its methodology in a manner that resulted in a "complete surprise" to those attempting to
follow the Court's securities jurisprudence. Id. at 1342-43. More "disturbing," she argues, is the
potential effect of this shift on the securities bar. Id. Gustafson creates a wide opening for lawyers who
should have a "reasonable basis" for bringing lawsuits. Id. at 1346. According to Maynard, any "position
that might possibly persuade a court of the desired result" is now acceptable. Id. at 1345; see also
Patricia J. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron
Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C. L. Rev. 115, 143 n.179 (1998) (describing Court's
statutory-interpretation approach in Gustafson and noting that it illustrates "confusion wrought by
judicial disagreements on the proper choice and use of interpretive methods" as disagreement over term
"prospectus" led to disagreements over "role[] of statutory definitions, dictionary definitions, usages,
legislative history, canons of construction, stare decisis, and the effect of congressional reenactment after
consistent judicial interpretation").
339. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 14-16, 24-26, 334-37, and accompanying text.
341. See Sale, supra note 260, at 590-92; see also Letsou, supra note 58, at 125.
342. See Donna M. Nagy, The "Possession vs. Use" Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by
Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1129, 1156-68 (1999)
(describing disclose-or-abstain rule for insider trading).
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provide evidence of traceability prior to discovery. 3" Courts generally
allowed the shareholders to proceed on the basis of allegations that they
purchased pursuant to an offering.' If the shareholders were unable to
prove traceability, the court might consider the issue at summary judgment
or, perhaps, recertify the class. 5 Accordingly, shareholders had access to
discovery and, thus, the opportunity to determine whether the alleged
misstatement or omission was in fact misleading. When Gustafson is
applied to find that only Original Shareholders qualify as plaintiffs, it
eliminates Aftermarket Shareholders, arguably those most likely to make a
claim."u Moreover, eliminating Aftermarket Shareholders at the motion-to-
dismiss stage prevents discovery and thereby allows defendants to avoid the
consequences of any fraud-like statements, defeating the deterrent purpose
of the statute. To ensure that the goals of the Acts are accomplished, the
tracing requirement must be modified.
D. Adopting ProofMethods from Toxic-Substance Litigation to
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) Tracing Requirements
As discussed above, courts since Barnes have made it increasingly
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain their remedies under sections 11 and
12(a)(2). In Kirkwood v. Taylor, 7 the court rejected all of the tracing
methods proposed by the shareholders except direct tracing, which, as
defined by that court, is available only to Original Shareholders." In doing
343. See supra note 144.
344. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Abbey v. ComputerMemories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870,873 & n.2, 874 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(rejecting request for additional discovery where court found tracing would be impossible aid granting
summary judgment).
346. See In re Computron Software, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319 (D.NJ. 1998) (noting defendants'
argument that Original Purchasers probably sold shares "long before" disclosure of problems and,
therefore, were unlikely to have suffered losses); see also Siconolfi & McGeehan, supra note 221, at Al
(describing how big investors often "dump" hot IPO shares or engage in "flipping" within hours of
offering).
347. 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984).
348. See i at 1378-83; see also supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. Some courts have
attempted to skirt this problem by adopting the prospectus-delivery requirement that allows Aftermarket
Shareholders who purchased their shares within the prospectus delivery period, often only 25 days, to
meet the tracing requirement. This theory has the appeal ofa bright-line rule-only those shareholders
who purchase within the requisite number of days after the offering would have standing to sue. It is,
however, unworkable. First, the requisite number of days varies. See supra notes 171-74 and
accompanying text. Moreover, some offerings are not subject to the prospectus-delivery requirement.
Thus, many shareholders would still be left without a remedy. It is not, therefore, a bright-line rule. See
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so, it emphasized that the rejected methods would not have allowed the
shareholders to prove that they actually held Offering Shares. 49 Rather, it
found that at the most, the heritage, contrabroker, and fungible-mass
methods would allow the shareholders to prove only that they "might" have
held such shares.350 Such proof, the court concluded, was insufficient for
standing purposes.35' Other courts have added further restrictions or tried
Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1375. Finally, given Gustafson's approach to defining and restricting the term
prospectus, it is inappropriate to apply a prospectus standard to a registration-statement claim.
Courts have also rejected pleas from shareholders to shift the burden of proof on tracing to defendants.
See supra note 111. Shifting the burden of proof will not solve the problem. Tracing is impossible, thus
merely shifting the burden of proving it to the defendants will ensure only that the defendants, instead of
the plaintiffs, always lose. Compare, e.g., Harris v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 102 F.3d 1429,
1432 (7th Cir. 1996) (imposing burden of production regarding causation on plaintiff in asbestos
litigation), with Richards v. Owens Illinois, 14 Cal. 4th 985, 989 (1997) (holding that plaintiff bears
burden of proving asbestos product was "defective," asbestos caused injury, and exposure to defendant's
asbestos product; burden then shifts to defendant to prove product did not cause injury).
349. See Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1380.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 1383. The courts have been overly restrictive in their approaches, relying on Judge
Friendly's determination that tracing is required as a matter of statutory interpretation. Unlike these
courts, however, Judge Friendly did not mention the term "standing" or even analyze the issue as such.
Instead, the court held only that the shareholders could not share in the settlement unless they could
show that their Aftermarket Shares were actually Offering Shares. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269,
271 (2d Cir. 1967). Since Barnes, however, courts have repeatedly implemented the tracing requirement,
defining the issue as one of standing. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. None of these courts
have explained the issue. Instead, they simply state that shareholders must trace their shares to acquire
standing, citing to Barnes. See, e.g., Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 933 F. Supp. 763, 766 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Stack v. Lobo, 903
F. Supp. 1361, 1375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995); In re Delmarva See. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1293, 1309 (D. Del.
1992); Guenther v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437, 1439 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Ramtek
Sec. Litig., No. C 88-20195 RPA, 1990 WL 157391, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7,1990); Abbey v. Computer
Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870,873-75 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59,
69-70 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
Standing, in the Article III constitutional sense, is not, however, at issue here. The history of the
statute reveals that Congress intended to exercise its maximum Article III powers. See H.R. Rep. No. 85,
at 22 (1933), reprinted in 2 J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, Legislative History of the Securities Act
of1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1973) (stating that it was "obviously" within Congress's
power to accord remedies to all purchasers affected by misstatements or omissions in registered
documents and that congressional power was vested "as far and to whatever circumstances the
Constitution allows"). The issue is whether the plaintiffs can prove the statutory elements of their case
by a preponderance of the evidence. This is the standard applied to civil causes of action under the
Securities Act. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943) (noting that
preponderance is sufficient for civil cause of action under section 17(a) of Securities Act). The issue,
then, is one of injury and whether holding proper shares is actually a requirement of the cause of action.
See In re Regal Communications Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 94-179, 1995 WL 550454, at * 10-11 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 14, 1995) (noting that where proffered class representatives have suffered injury, they have
standing, and stating that whether they hold proper shares is actually requirement of cause of action).
Accordingly, the courts have erred by setting forth a requirement that is impossible for many statutorily
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slight permutations on the direct-tracing method, but none have solved the
problem the direct-tracing requirement creates-precluding shareholders
who are entitled to a remedy from accessing it.
Courts will not, however, give up thirty years of tracing jurisprudence
and start allowing all open-market purchasers to sue under sections 11 and
12(a)(2). Instead, the courts can resolve this problem by reconsidering the
ways in which they allow plaintiffs to trace their shares and adopt a
statistical approach like the one rejected by the Kirkwood court. In
Kirkwood, the shareholders proposed to compare total Offering Shares to
total shares on the market to provide proof of the likelihood that any share
purchased in the Aftermarket was an offering share.352 Given that the
standard of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence, the shareholders
argued, such a measure was sufficient.3"3 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
proposed probability measure because it offered proof only that the shares
might have been Offering Shares. The court further found that the plaintiffs
should not be able to use statistically derived proof for causation because it
was still relatively rare in the toxic-tort context.354 Now, however,
acceptance of such proof has gained ascendancy in all types of civil
litigation355 and can be used for proof of traceability here. Further, allowing
statistically based proof would satisfy the statute's requirements and effect
the statute's goal in an efficient and pragmatic manner.
Although addressing the causation element in the context of a settlement
opinion, the In re "Agent Orange "Product Liability Litigation35 6 court was
one of the first courts to face and explore in detail the indeterminate-
plaintiff question for toxic torts.357 The problem the court faced was that
even if the class as a whole could prove Agent Orange could have caused
the disease at issue, it was unlikely individual class members would be able
eligible plaintiffs to prove. Indeed, by limiting potential plaintiffs to those who can meet the direct-
tracing requirement, the courts have arguably imposed a requirement as difficult to prove as a reliance
requirement would be. Yet, Congress created a reliance-free remedy because it wanted the remedies to
be accessible. See supra note 267 and accompanying text
352. See Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
353. See id. at 1378.
354. See id.
355. See David L. Faigman et al., 3 Modem Scientific Evidence § 20.12.2[4][b] (West 1999).
356. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
357. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 643,659 (1992) (discussingAgent Orange decision and noting that many
"evidentiary questions about toxic causation came to the fore" in lawsuit).
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to prove that Agent Orange specifically caused their injury." 8 Such proof
was unavailable because the type of scientific evidence employed to
establish causation for diseases is based on comparing the evidence of
disease in different groups. Thus, it was impossible to separate the
"background" level of cancer in the population from that contracted by the
plaintiffs exposed to Agent Orange.359 Ideal proof that would trace the
pathological steps in the development of, and the role played by Agent
Orange in, an individual's cancer was beyond the capacity of scientific
methodology to produce." ° The causation problem thus resulted in
indeterminate plaintiffs.36'
Relying on the group-based evidence before it, the court also found that
the probability of proof of specific causation would be less than fifty
percent for any plaintiff. It reached this conclusion because even where it
was possible to prove Agent Orange could cause the type of injury suffered
by the plaintiffs as a whole, the background causes of the disease were far
more prevalent than any effect of Agent Orange. As a result, the court found
it was impossible to "pinpoint" those plaintiffs for whom Agent Orange
was, in fact, the cause of their cancer.362 Therefore, the court found that
group-based statistical evidence would suffice for proof of causation if it
offered proof that the likelihood exceeded fifty percent that Agent Orange
caused the type of cancer in question, as opposed to being the specific
cause.
Many other courts have considered this problem in various toxic-
substance contexts and have permitted proof of causation through
statistically based evidence.363 The use of statistically derived evidence for
358. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 833.
359. Id. at 834; see also Green, supra note 357, at 647 (noting that where "background rates ofthe
disease" exist, epidemiology cannot provide direct evidence of causation of disease in any individual).
360. See Green, supra note 357, at 645.
361. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 833-35; cf William K-S. Wang & Marc . Steinberg, Insider
Trading § 6.5.4, at 450 (discussing indeterminate plaintiffs in insider-trading context).
362. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 833-35.
363. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (Bendectin);
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996) (breast implants); Marder v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986) (intrauterine device); Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp.
306,308 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (vaccine). For opinions suggesting that even lower levels ofproof would be
acceptable, see In Re Joint E&S Distributors Asbestos Litigation, 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995)
(criticizing lower court for applying standard requiring that epidemiological evidence provide proof of
doubling of risk and holding that lower levels were sufficient with proper jury instructions); Allen v.
United States, 588 F. Supp. 247,418-19 (D. Utah 1984); and Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d
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proof of causation resolves the indeterminate-plaintiffproblem by assessing
causation "with due regard for the available evidence,"3" allowing plaintiffs
who have proved the other elements of their cases to receive compensation
for any damages for which they have proved the cause with a greater than
fifty-percent probability.3" The exception to this rule is when the absence of
particularistic or direct evidence is due to destruction of evidence by the
plaintiffs, or "spoliation." As a result, even when the evidence is "thin and
attenuated," probabilities based on statistically derived evidence are now
sufficient to support causation in the toxic-tort context because "stronger
and better evidence is unavailable."
366
Further, the use of statistical evidence in these cases resolves a problem
that a particularistic-evidence requirement creates. The harm from retaining
a particularistic-evidence requirement exceeds the harm from allowing
statistical evidence367 because a requirement that is impossible for the
plaintiffs to prove allows the defendants to escape liability, even where it is
"virtually certain" that the defendants injured thousands of people and
caused significant damages.368
671, 674-76 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). For a discussion of this issue in the asbestos-litigation
context, see Faigman, supra note 355, § 40.1.2.
364. Green, supra note 357, at 680.
365. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 835; see also David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 857 (1984).
Although no longer discussed as "strong" and "weak," early scholarship on this issue and the Agent
Orange decision discussed the evidence as divisible into those categories. The strong version of the
preponderance rule rejects the possibility that statistics alone would be sufficient for proof of causation.
See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 835; Rosenberg, supra, at 857. Instead, it requires some form of
particularistic or anecdotal evidence. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 835. That evidence is "'proof
that can provide direct and actual knowledge ofthe causal relationship between the defendant's tortious
conduct and the plaintiff's injury.'" Id (citing Rosenberg, supra, at 870); see also Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (D.S.C. 1981); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 427 A.2d 1121, 1125
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
Conversely, the weak version ofthe preponderance rule allows verdicts based only on statistical evidence.
See Agent Orange 597 F. Supp. at 835. Arguably, particularistic evidence does not differ in a "significant
qualitative way" from statistical evidence. Id The term particularistic proof implies that "direct and actual
knowledge ofthe causal relationship between the defendant's tortious conductand the plaintiffs injury" exists.
Id at 836. Yet, in reality, particularistic evidence provides no more than abasis fordrawing a conclusion about
a "perceived balance of probabilities." Id (citing Rosenberg supra, at 870).
366. Green, supra note 357, at 681; see also Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 836.
367. See Green, supra note 357, at 681.
368. Id; see also Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 881,893 (1982) (noting that relaxing cause-in-fact rules allows
for recovery corresponding to injury actually done); Green, supra note 357, at 684 (noting that one must
consider possibility of false negatives).
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This argument applies to securities cases under sections 11 and 12(a)(2).
Assuming that they can prove the existence of a misstatement or omission,
Offering Shareholders are entitled to a remedy under sections 11 and
12(a)(2). 69 Their injury is "mass" in nature, not sporadic; that is, all
Offering Shareholders are presumed to have been injured by the existence
of the misstatement or omission. Yet, courts have held that to prove their
case, the shareholders must connect their shares to the offering at issue. For
Aftermarket Shareholders, that requirement, like proof of causation for
indeterminate tort plaintiffs, is impossible because specific evidence of the
connection does not exist.37° As in the toxic-tort context, particularistic or
direct evidence is unavailable.37" ' Further, the plaintiffs are not responsible
for their inability to provide the requisite evidence. Instead, the nature of the
securities market makes the evidence unavailable. As a result, these
plaintiffs, like those in the toxic-tort context, are indeterminate. 372 Thus,
assuming that they can prove the existence of a misstatement or omission-
or that the defendants caused the "harm" as defined by the statute-
allowing them to use statistically derived evidence would provide these
indeterminate plaintiffs with an opportunity to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence,373 that their shares were Offering Shares.
To see how statistically based evidence might work for proof of
traceability, consider a simplified example. Assume that a company, New
Company, made an IPO (Initial Offering) of 1000 shares at a price of five
dollars per share. From the time of the Initial Offering until New
Company's next offering of the same type of shares, all of the shares on the
market would be from the Initial Offering and one-hundred percent of the
shares on the market would be Offering Shares. Therefore, regardless of
when they bought their shares, all of the shareholders would be Offering
Shareholders and should have access to the remedies of sections 11 and
12(a)(2). Here, statistically derived proof solves the problem of
369. See, e.g., supra notes 17-59 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 193-231 and accompanying text.
371. Cf Green, supra note 357, at 680 (suggesting that "[t]he point is that plaintiffs should be
required to prove causation by a preponderance of the available evidence, not by some predetermined
standard that may require nonexistent studies").
372. See id. at 648 n.23.
373. This is the standard of proof generally accepted in all civil litigation. See Federal Judicial Ctr.,
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 169 (1999); Green, supra note 357, at 691. But see Daniel A.
Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1232-51 (1987) (advocating that lesser proof levels
should be accepted in toxic-tort context); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Tort: Burdens of Proof
Standards of Persuasion and Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale L.J. 376, 395-401 (1986) (same).
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shareholders who purchase Offering Shares in the Aftermarket and are,
therefore, unable to meet the direct tracing requirement. All Offering
Shareholders, not just Original Shareholders, would be able to proceed with
their section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims.374
Assume now that New Company decides to make a follow-on offering
(Second Offering) of 500 shares of stock of the same type as that issued in
its Initial Offering. Now, if the Aftermarket Shareholders who purchased
either before or after the second offering want to sue for an alleged
misstatement or omission in the Initial Offering documents, they would be
able to offer statistically derived evidence to prove their share ownership.
Shares on the market issued in the Initial Offering amount to sixty-six
percent of the total shares issued, providing all Aftermarket Shareholders
with access to a remedy for the Initial Offering. Only Original Shareholders
of the Second Offering would be able to sue for any misstatement or
omission in that offering because shares from that offering would amount
only to thirty-three percent of the shares on the market. For the Initial
Offering, the statistically derived evidence for tracing may be overinclusive,
providing some Second Offering Shareholders with remedies for a
misstatement or omission in the Initial Offering. For the Second Offering,
the scope of the potential plaintiffs remains underinclusive.3" And, any time
the percentage of later Offering Shares exceeds those in the earlier, disputed
offering, the plaintiffs will not succeed with their statistically based
evidence.
The sections themselves provide several good reasons to justify the
proposed approach. First, section 11 obviates proof of reliance for plaintiffs
who bought within a year of offering,376 thereby effectively limiting the
pool of potential plaintiffs to those purchasing within that time frame.
Second, section 12(a)(2) limits the plaintiff class to those in privity with the
seller, again a substantial obstacle for any shareholder not purchasing from
374. In our civil justice system, the purpose of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is to
minimize errors in adjudication. See Green, supra note 357, at 687. The goal is to minimize errors
favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant, resulting in a "fifty-plus standard" as a measure of the
burden of proof. Id Accepting statistical proof of traceability for sections 11 and 12(a)(2) would allow
plaintiffs the opportunity to present other elements of their case, and if they were able to do so, to
proceed to ajury. Thus, the use of statistics here accomplishes a purpose similar to that underlying the
preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, creating balance between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
375. Note that this proposal has the potential to solve the problem direct tracing creates when shares
enter the Aftermarket through Regulation 144(k). Seesupra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. Now,
when the unregistered shares are a small percentage of the shares available, Offering Shareholders will
be able to use statistics to trace their shares to the allegedly faulty offering.
376. See supra note 28 and accompanying text
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a market maker. 77 Third, both sections have one-year inquiry-notice
requirements or three-year absolute statutes of limitations.378 Thus, once
New Company makes information available, either through a published
report or a press release, the statute of limitations begins to run, further
limiting the availability of the remedies.379
Fourth, the statute caps defendants' total liability by limiting recoveries
to the offering price."' Thus, the defendants will not pay any more in
damages than they earned from the offering.3"' Further, each plaintiff's
damages are limited to the offering price,8 ' and shareholders able to meet
the fifty-percent standard would be entitled only to a pro rata share of the
total damages.3 83 Moreover, any Aftermarket Shareholders who sold before
377. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 32, 53, and accompanying text.
379. Under the efficient-market hypothesis, we assume that all publicly available information entering
the market is reflected in the price of shares. Accordingly, all purchasers, even non-Offering Purchasers,
are presumably harmed by a misstatement or omission. Thus, some affected shareholders would still be
denied recovery. Cf Delgado, supra note 368, at 892 (noting that in toxic-tort context, relaxed causation
rules allow all persons injured by defendants' conduct to recover). Moreover, over time, as the total
number of shares on the market increase, the probability that shares from any one offering would exceed
50% would decrease, appropriately leaving more Aftermarket Shareholders without a remedy. Thus, this
proposal is underinclusive as well.
Over the life of the company, however, the insider-trading analogy, and thereby the public-offering
misstatement problem, presumably diminishes. Cf Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1203-
04 (1 st Cir. 1996) (noting quarterly reports help provide requisite information in shelf-offering context).
Indeed, for this reason, Congress required proof of reliance for investors asserting section 11 claims
more than a year after the offering. See supra note 28. Further, the 1934 Act and accompanying
regulations require companies to issue quarterly and annual statements that cover much of the material in
an offering document. In addition, companies regularly issue press and other releases discussing
changes. Accordingly, this proposal would protect early investors in young companies-potentially the
investors taking the largest risks and those most likely to be harmed by informational asymmetries and
inefficiencies arising from those asymmetries or from imperfect information.
380. Both sections limit damages to the offering price of the securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e),
771(2) (1994). Further, section 11 specifically limits the maximum aggregate recovery to the offering
price. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1994) ("In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed
the price at which the security was offered to the public."); see also In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79
F.1RD. 283,298 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (noting aggregate damages "can never exceed" offering amount); cf
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269,271 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that expanding recovery to all Aftermarket
Purchasers would dilute recovery pool). Further, defendants have the option to correct potential damages
by proving that the alleged loss was not caused by the alleged misstatement or omission. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel K. Fischel, OptimalDamages in Securities Cases, 52 Chi. L. Rev. 611,636 (1985)
(noting that loss-causation provision allows for use of market model to correct potential damage award).
381. Cf Delgado, supra note 368, at 893-94 (noting that loss-spreading effect of relaxing cause-in-
fact rules allows "exact" accident costs to be imposed on defendants).
382. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771(2).
383. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
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the price declined are ineligible. In addition, the defendants are entitled to
argue that any recovery should be reduced if the loss was caused by
something other than the alleged misstatement or omission.3 Thus, if the
defendants made the proper disclosure, or the allegedly misleading
disclosure or omission did not cause the fall in the price of the stock, the
defendants have the opportunity to reduce or eliminate any damages."'
These statutory provisions limit the possibility for excess liability and over-
deterrence-one of the main concerns in the tort context.386 In the terms of
the hypothetical described previously, the statutory-damages limitations
would limit the defendants' total liability to $5000, calculated by
multiplying the offering price, five dollars, by the number of shares, which
is 1000. The plaintiffs' potential damages are limited to five dollars per
share, no matter what they paid for their shares, and all shareholders would
divide the total recovery. Thus, the most problematic effect of the proposal
would be to dilute the recovery pool. Such dilution is justifiable387 because
without an alternative to tracing, no Aftermarket Shareholders would ever
be able to recover.88
The most important argument supporting this proposal is that without a
new way to prove tracing, the mechanism to enforce the recovery rights of
Aftermarket Shareholders is eliminated. It is increasingly likely, therefore,
that defendants will never face the consequences of untruthful offering
documents. Indeed, in support of the argument in favor of direct tracing, at
least one defendant has argued that because IPOs are usually profitable
investments in the short run, Original Shareholders never lose money; only
384. Seesupra note 65.
385. Moreover, under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, even non-Offering Shareholders were harmed
by the misstatement or omission. Thus, even though they are entitled to a remedy under the Exchange
Act, there is arguably a justification for providing them with one here. See supra notes 253 -56 and
accompanying text; see also In re Computron Software, Inc. Sec. Litig., 6F. Supp. 2d 313,319 (D.NJ.
1998) (noting argument of defendants that Original Shareholders likely sold their shares "long before"
company disclosed problems and did not, therefore, suffer any loss).
386. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1360 (1985) (discussing deterrence aspect of trials and problems of
probabilistic proof in inculcating deterrence message); see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts 284 (5th ed. 1984) (suggesting that legal responsibility must be limited to
causes "closely connected" to injury to justify liability).
387. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
388. See supra notes 212-84 and accompanying text; cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig.,
597 F. Supp. 740, 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (arguing that although use of statistically derived evidence might
allow some plaintiffs who were not injured by Agent Orange to collect damages, thereby diluting
recovery pool and denigrating other plaintiffs' injuries, alternative was no recovery and no deterrence).
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Aftermarket Shareholders do.389 As a result, the deterrent effect of the
statute is at least undermined, if not eliminated.39 The result is a market for
lemons.39'
Although defendants might argue that eliminating tracing will increase
the so-called strike value of complaints in these cases, the Securities Act
itself contains a built-in limitation on such complaints. Section 11 (e) of the
Securities Act allows the court to require a plaintiff to post a bond for costs,
including attorneys' fees, and allows the court to assess such costs where
appropriate.3 92 Congress designed this provision to deter actions brought
solely for settlement, or strike value.393 Further, judges can address any such
problem by taking an active role in managing discovery in such cases to
minimize the strike value of such complaints. For example, the court could
design a limited initial-discovery program focused on the alleged
misstatements or omissions, including a proscribed set of documents and a
prohibition on depositions. Thus, in a case alleging a misstatement or
omission in connection with the Initial Offering described above, the court
might require production only of the files of the chief financial officer, the
underwriters, and the accountants related to the Initial Offering.3" A limited
discovery plan would counterbalance the shift in the balance of power that
this proposal makes for plaintiffs.395
Moreover, when Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Act
in 1995, it created several provisions to limit strike suits, then largely
perceived to be a problem with section 10(b) claims. Congress did not,
however, prescribe similar changes for the Securities Act. And, whether
over- or under-deterrence would result from this proposal is only part of the
concern to be addressed. The effect of the judicially created tracing
requirement is to eliminate at the pleading stage potentially valid claims. To
the extent that this motivation, like the Supreme Court's in Gustafson, is
based, even in part, on a perception of excess securities claims, the result is
courts eliminating causes of action.3 96 Congress created a statutorily based
389. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
390. See Delgado, supra note 368, at 894 (noting that relaxed cause-in-fact rule promotes deterrence
goals).
391. See supra note 217.
392. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994).
393. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 1838, at42 (1934).
394. See Sale, supra note 260, at 580-81.
395. See id
396. Seesupra notes 176,200,213,338, 397.
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reason. Further complicating the policy-based elimination of such claims is
that judges suffer from bounded rationality and, at least arguably, have an
incentive to reduce their case loads.
397
Additionally, although the proposal might result in an overinclusive
plaintiff pool, it would not have the same effect on the defendants. To
succeed with their claims, plaintiffs would still have to prove the existence
of a misstatement or omission-a difficult task at best. Thus, the argument
that statistics can result in trapping otherwise nonliable defendants does not
apply here. Only those defendants who were involved in the issuance of a
registration statement, prospectus, or oral communication containing a
misstatement or omission would be liable.398
Finally, the use of statistics here works to ensure that the statute's
purpose is carried out.391 The purpose of the statute is to protect investors
and the integrity of the capital market by eliminating the informational
asymmetries inherent in public offerings.' Indeed, it would help to force
defendants to take seriously their statutory due-diligence responsibilities to
deter misstatements and omissions-the reason Congress created such
stringent provisions as sections 11 and 12(a)(2) in the first place.401
397. The development of the tracing requirement is arguably one of the many ways in which the
courts avoid having to deal with the hard issues that securities cases can present-either in the discovery
or the substantive contexts. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 157 (1998) (arguing that courts have used various procedural mechanisms to avoid
hard cases, including those involving securities issues); Sale, supra note 260, at 582 (noting that judges
dislike discovery process); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1589, 1635-44
(positing theory that limited number of securities-fraud cases before Supreme Court and bounded
rationality may, in part, account for Court's willingness to accept SEC's position on cases).
398. See Nesson, supra note 386, at 1378-85 (describing problem of allowing jury to assess liability
of Blue Bus Co. based on percent of its buses traveling route where accident by unidentified bus
occurred, thereby potentially "tagging" defendants who did not commit offense). Here, proof of the
existence of a misstatement or omission prevents nonliable defendants from being overincluded by the
proposed statistical solution.
399. Moreover, the main argument against allowing juries to consider statistical evidence is that it
provides "a false veneer of certainty." Green, supra note 357, at 693. Here, however, the difficult
element to prove is actually the misstatement or omission. Thus, allowing a case to proceed on the basis
of statistical proof of an Offering Share is less likely to result in the jury's uncritical acceptance of the
plaintiffs' case.
400. See supra notes 14-16, 339-42, and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 14-16,32-36,339-42, and accompanying text; see also Delgado, supra note
368, at 894-95 (noting that in cause-in-fact context, relaxed rule creates incentive for defendants to
"investigate" danger of their actions on others).
Washington Law Review
V. CONCLUSION
Tracing is a judicial invention that creates an impossible task for
plaintiffs-namely, connecting Aftermarket purchases to the offering
document or communication in question. As a result, although Aftermarket
Shareholders are entitled to a remedy under the statute, they are precluded
from accessing it. Thus, tracing is underinclusive and potentially eliminates
the consequences the statute was designed to impose. The courts'
deployment of Gustafson to restrict further and often to eliminate even the
pleading of traceability also limits the availability of these remedies. The
combination of tracing and Gustafson is likely to defeat Congress's goal in
enacting the statute: ensuring truth in public-offering documents. To correct
this problem, courts should allow shareholders to use statistical evidence to
connect the securities they hold to the offering at issue. This method would
reinstate the consequences intended as an incentive for due diligence as to
the truthfulness of offering documents-one of the most important aspects
of our financial markets.
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